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The United States of California: Ninth
Circuit Tips the Dormant Commerce
Clause Scales in Favor of the Golden
State’s Animal Welfare Legislation
Abstract
In November 2018, California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition
12, the Prevention of Cruelty to Farm Animals Act. This law requires in-state
and out-of-state farmers to provide additional living space for egg-laying
hens, breeding pigs, and calves raised for veal by 2022 if the farmers wish to
continue doing business within the state. In response, North American Meat
Institute (NAMI), whose members account for approximately 95% of the
country’s output of various meat products, filed a lawsuit in federal district
court seeking a preliminary injunction against Proposition 12’s enforcement.
NAMI contended Proposition 12 violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, a
legal doctrine stemming from Congress’s commerce powers under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, prohibiting states from passing laws
discriminating against interstate commerce. Ultimately, the district court
declined to grant NAMI’s request for a preliminary injunction, which the
Ninth Circuit affirmed was not an abuse of judicial discretion.
The Ninth Circuit correctly held Proposition 12 does not clearly
discriminate against interstate commerce. However, the Ninth Circuit erred
in holding the law was not extraterritorial legislation because this decision
contravened Supreme Court decisions prohibiting states from regulating
conduct occurring outside of their borders. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
decision opens the floodgates for California to enact similar legislation
essentially controlling the national economy. The best solution to this issue,
particularly regarding animal welfare reform, is for Congress to establish
national guidelines that meaningfully improve the lives of farm animals while
prohibiting individual states from controlling the conduct of the other fortynine state actors.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Absent a preliminary injunction, NAMI’s members and
countless farmers throughout the country will suffer severe
irreparable harm. . . . [T]he Sales Ban irreparably harms veal
and pork producers by putting them to a Hobson’s choice:
either spend millions of dollars to comply with California’s
confinement requirements . . . or be excluded from the
California market and suffer the resulting loss of revenues
and customer goodwill. Either way, Proposition 12 subjects
veal and pork producers to tremendous costs, none of which
can be recovered post-trial because California’s sovereign
immunity precludes a damages action against the State.1
In Nami v. Becerra, the question of whether California overstepped its
commerce-impacting authority or simply exercised its police powers to
promote the public health, general welfare, safety, and morals of its citizens2
came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.3 In short, appellant, the
North American Meat Institute (NAMI), and amici, including several states4
and business entities,5 sought a preliminary injunction against California’s
1. Brief for Appellant at 11, N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020) (No.
19-56408), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021) [hereinafter NAMI Opening Brief]. NAMI member
companies account for more than 95% of the United States’ output of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey,
and processed meat products. See Complaint for Declaratory & Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive
Relief at 2, N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-08569),
aff’d, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020). For clarity purposes, this Note uses the term “Nami” in the
main text to refer to the Ninth Circuit preliminary injunction suit on appeal and uses the term “NAMI”
to refer to the North American Meat Institute.
2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v.
State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), abrogated by W.
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (“There are, however, certain powers, existing in the
sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description
and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated, and
without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of the public.”).
3. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518.
4. See Brief of Ind. et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 16, N. Am.
Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518 (No. 19-56408) [hereinafter Amici States Brief]. Eleven states are
included as amici curiae in this brief: Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. Id.
5. See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 1–2,
27, N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518 (No. 19-56408) [hereinafter Amici Commerce Brief]. Three
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Proposition 12.6 Appellant argued that Proposition 12’s sales ban on meat
sold within California produced below certain minimum space requirements
would irreparably harm its members because the law impermissibly
discriminates against interstate commerce, operates as a protectionist trade
barrier, and controls extraterritorial commerce in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.7 In opposition, appellee Xavier Becerra, then-Attorney
General of California, and intervenor-appellees, Humane Society of the
United States,8 argued that the Ninth Circuit should affirm the denial of the
preliminary injunction.9 They contended that Proposition 12 does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, regulate extraterritorial conduct, or
substantially burden interstate commerce, and even if it did, any burden on
interstate commerce would not exceed the benefits to California.10
As animal welfare continues to grow into a national issue, Nami is
important not only because case law remains unsettled on whether preventing
animal cruelty is a sufficient basis to permit burdening interstate commerce
but also because Nami impacts state actors and animal rights organizations
seeking to promote animal welfare legislation in the future that will
substantially impact interstate commerce.11 This Note argues that Nami
correctly held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding
Proposition 12 is not discriminatory and does not substantially burden
interstate commerce given the case’s procedural posture.12 However, this
Note contends that Nami erred when deciding the extraterritorial legislation

parties are included as amici curiae in this brief: the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and Food Marketing Institute. Id.
6. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 1–2; see also infra note 8 and accompanying text.
7. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1. See generally Reply Brief for Appellant at 1–28, N.
Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518 (No. 19-56408) [hereinafter NAMI Reply Brief]. In essence, the
Dormant Commerce Clause is a legal doctrine inferred from Congress’s commerce authority under
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits states from enacting legislation that
discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce, even when Congress has not specifically
enacted legislation that is designed to regulate interstate commerce within that particular area. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also discussion infra Part II.
8. See Answering Brief for Appellee-Intervenors at 1, 42, N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518
(No. 19-56408) [hereinafter Humane Society Brief].
9. See Answering Brief of State Defendants at 1–2, N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518 (No. 1956408) [hereinafter State Defendants Brief]; see also infra note 11 and accompanying text.
10. See State Defendants Brief, supra note 9, at 10–33; Humane Society Brief, supra note 8, at
28–35.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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issue because Proposition 12 conflicts with the Supreme Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence prohibiting “economic [b]alkanization.”13
Even as an unpublished opinion, Nami is problematic because its holding
encourages economic powerhouse states like California to manipulate other
states and businesses to bend to its public policy determinations, or else face
significant economic losses.14
Part II provides an overview of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
unpacks California Propositions 2 and 12, which set the stage for Nami.15 Part
III discusses Nami’s facts, procedural history, and decision, which held that
NAMI failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits in proving that
Proposition 12 violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.16 Section IV.A
argues that Nami correctly held the district court did not abuse its discretion
on the discrimination and substantial burden claims, while Section IV.B
asserts that Nami erred in not recognizing that Proposition 12 conflicts with
Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause principles prohibiting
extraterritorial legislation.17 Part V explores Nami’s implications for animal
welfare, the national economy, and economic powerhouse states, which
reflect the need for the Supreme Court’s guidance as to the extent states can
burden interstate commerce in promoting animal welfare reform.18 Part V
also suggests Congress could be the solution to this growing animal welfare
versus interstate commerce issue.19 Part VI briefly summarizes and
concludes.20

13. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). “Economic balkanization”
is succinctly described as “an economy so clogged by customs barriers, tariffs, embargoes, quotas and
regulations as to remove all semblance of a freely trading capitalistic society.” Paul S. Kline, PubliclyOwned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the Market Participation Doctrine, 96 DICK. L.
REV. 331, 356 (1992). As discussed below, the consolidation of federal economic power through the
Commerce Clause was designed to counteract the selfish nature of states looking out solely for their
own interests by striking down state regulations significantly impeding interstate commerce. See
discussion infra Part II.
14. See discussion infra Sections V.B, V.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. See discussion infra Section V.E.
20. See discussion infra Part VI.
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II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE REVISITED
In the wake of the failures of the Articles of Confederation, the Founding
Fathers, when drafting the United States Constitution, were concerned that
states would selfishly impose protectionist measures, such as tariffs, to
promote the well-being of their citizens to the detriment of out-of-state
individuals.21 In practice, this would cause other states to retaliate with similar
measures, ultimately to the detriment of the national economy.22 To address
this potential problem of economic infighting, the Framers drafted the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”23
Since the Commerce Clause does not explicitly impose restrictions on a
state’s legislative authority to regulate commerce when Congress is silent on
a particular issue, the Supreme Court assumed the mantle of adjudicating
these disputes under the Commerce Clause’s goal of promoting national
economic unity, known as the Negative or Dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC).24 Although the Supreme Court has struck down congressional
legislation with commendable goals—preventing gun violence within

21. See Jennifer L. Larsen, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV.
844, 845–46 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“A primary concern of the Founding Fathers was, in order to
prosper, the [n]ation’s economy needed to be centrally regulated. . . . Consequently, this worry caused
the Founding Fathers to draft the Constitution to prevent [s]tates from harming interstate commerce.
James Madison wrote that the ‘Commerce Clause “grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing
[s]tates in taxing the non-importing[] and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against
injustice among the [s]tates themselves.”’” (quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911))).
22. See id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see John Schreiner, The Irony of the Ninth Circuit’s Expanded
(Ab)use of the Commerce Clause, 33 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 16 (2005).
24. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2018). As mentioned in the
accompanying main text, Supreme Court jurisprudence describing the Commerce Clause as grounds
to invalidate state legislation on matters substantially affecting interstate commerce when Congress is
silent is known as the “[N]egative Commerce Clause,” see id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring), or the
“[D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause,” see id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Interpreting the Commerce
Clause as passively restricting state legislative authority is not without criticism. See, e.g., United
Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The [N]egative Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved
unworkable in practice. . . . Because this Court has no policy role in regulating interstate commerce,
I would discard the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”).
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schools25 and criminalizing gender-based violence26—that are not
substantially related to its enumerated commerce powers, the Court has
refrained from clearly articulating the restrictive scope of the DCC on states’
authority to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.27 The Court’s
only guidance has been to prohibit states from exercising their power in a way
that substantially impedes interstate commerce.28
A. The DCC Foundation: Three Cases and Three Principles
1. Three Cases: Gibbons, Willson, and Cooley
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Supreme Court succinctly described the
judicial origins of the framework giving rise to the DCC as stemming from
three cases: Gibbons v. Ogden, Willson v. Black Bird, and Cooley v. Board of
Wardens.29 In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall illuminated the
scope of Congress’s power to regulate commerce under the Commerce
Clause, which includes the power to regulate both “the interchange of
commodities” and “commercial intercourse.”30 Chief Justice Marshall
contended that this commerce power, “like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges

25. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (“The possession of a gun in a local
school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce. . . . To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the [s]tates.”).
26. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“We accordingly reject the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local.”).
27. See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
28. See id. at 2090; see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“[The
Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”).
29. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090.
30. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89, 125 (1824)). The “interchange of
commodities,” as mentioned by the Court, referred strictly to the buying and selling of goods, Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824), while “commercial intercourse” refers to the physical
exchanging of goods between nations, including the navigation of said goods during an exchange, id.
at 190. Gibbons noted that the Commerce Clause undoubtedly granted Congress the power over both
aspects of commerce. See id. at 189–90.
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no limitations, other than [as] are prescribed in the [C]onstitution.”31
However, Marshall conceded that states concurrently share power to regulate
certain avenues of commerce, such as inspection laws, which Congress should
only reach when invoking a national purpose.32
Five years later in Willson v. Black Bird, Chief Justice Marshall held a
dam built by the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company, which controlled waters
from a stream forming part of an interstate waterway system in Delaware, did
not violate the Commerce Clause.33 Marshall noted that “[C]ongress has
passed no such act” regarding federal authority to regulate “those small
navigable creeks into which the tide flows.”34 Willson implied that individual
states, like Congress, held power to regulate commerce, particularly in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation.35
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania
law requiring vessels that refused to board a local pilot to pay a travel fee to a
fund for widows and children of deceased pilots as consistent with the
Commerce Clause.36 Here, the Court affirmed that the power to regulate
commerce is shared between Congress and the states, holding that certain
subjects “imperatively demand[] a single uniform rule” when operating
equally on national commerce.37 However, Cooley recognized that other
subjects “demand[] that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities
31. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
32. See id. at 203–04. In his concurring opinion, Justice Johnson took a different view on whether
commerce powers should be shared between Congress and the states, positing that Congress held the
exclusive power to regulate commerce. Id. at 236 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy,
weighing in on the potential ramifications of Justice Johnson’s concurrence, contended that had Justice
Johnson “prevailed and [s]tates been denied the power of concurrent regulation, history might have
seen sweeping federal regulations at an early date that foreclosed the [s]tates from experimentation
with laws and policies of their own, or, on the other hand, proposals to reexamine Gibbons’ broad
definition of commerce to accommodate the necessity of allowing [s]tates the power to enact laws to
implement the political will of their people.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090.
33. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
34. Id.
35. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090. In essence, these cases established the basic analytical
framework that the Commerce Clause would not be interpreted to grant Congress exclusive power
over commerce, but rather that the power over interstate commerce would be shared concurrently at
times between Congress and states, except in cases where certain commerce requires a “single uniform
rule.” See id. In those specific instances, the Commerce Clause would resolve any conflicts between
state legislation and federal legislation in favor of Congress. See id.
36. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 319 (1851).
37. Id.
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of navigation[,] . . . drawn from local knowledge and experience, and
conformed to local wants.”38 These three cases were vital for providing the
foundation informing our current DCC jurisprudence.39 The Supreme Court
recognized that states and Congress can both regulate interstate commerce,
but courts can find that states impermissibly burden interstate commerce even
when Congress is silent.40
2. Three Principles: Nondiscrimination, Undue Burdens, and
Extraterritoriality
Three key principles reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
the DCC—promoting nondiscriminatory legislation, preventing undue
burdens, and prohibiting extraterritorial regulations—are important in
illuminating the Court’s rationale for its decisions concerning the
constitutionality of state laws affecting interstate commerce.41 These
principles in turn guide lower courts when assessing the constitutionality of
state legislation impacting interstate commerce.42
Regarding
the
first
principle—promoting
nondiscriminatory
legislation—the Supreme Court has concluded that state laws discriminating
against interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.”43 The

38. Id. at 319–20.
39. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (“Though considerable uncertainties were yet to be overcome,
these precedents still laid the groundwork for the analytical framework that now prevails for
Commerce Clause cases.”).
40. See id. at 2090–91; see also discussion supra Part II.
41. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090–91; see also infra note 43 and accompanying text.
42. See discussion infra Section II.B; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (holding
that the Court’s DCC jurisprudence “reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers . . . that in order to
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic [b]alkanization that had
plagued relations among the [c]olonies and later among the [s]tates under the Articles of
Confederation”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1705 (1984) (“Under current doctrine, the [D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause is aimed
primarily at measures taken out of a desire to improve the economic position of in-staters at the
expense of out-of-staters.”). One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
discriminatory state law on DCC was in 1877, where a Missouri law excluding the transportation of
Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle into the state during eight months of the year, among other limitations,
was found to be unconstitutional because “[t]he police power of [Missouri] cannot obstruct foreign
commerce or inter-state commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise.” See Hannibal & St. J.R. Co.
v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473–74 (1877).
43. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005)). For a
helpful explanation of the Court’s theoretical reasons for holding these laws as per se invalid, see
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Court has defined discriminatory laws as those treating “in-state and out-ofstate economic interests” in a manner “benefit[ting] the former and
burden[ing] the latter.”44 Indeed, the only way a discriminatory state law can
survive judicial scrutiny is if it is narrowly tailored to advance “a legitimate
local purpose.”45 The Court has reasoned that striking down laws that burden
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner is fundamental to prohibiting
protectionist legislation and promoting national economic unity.46
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1705–06 (“When discrimination is worked against persons outside the
state, ordinary avenues of political redress are unavailable to the burdened class, which does not have
access to the state legislature. . . . [T]he prohibition of protectionism results from a perception that the
[D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause reflects an authoritative judgment that a state may not prefer its own
citizens over out-of-staters simply because it values their welfare more highly. In this respect, the
[D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause forbids a conclusion that a preference for in-staters over out-ofstaters is a permissible public value.”).
44. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007)
(quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). In this case, the
Court upheld a New York ordinance requiring the processing of waste at specific public facilities as
not discriminating against interstate commerce because it treated all private companies in the same
manner and because disposing of waste is a traditional state function. Id. at 344–45.
45. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t
of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 93 (1994)); see Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 353 (1977) (“When discrimination . . . is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it
both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.”); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (holding discriminatory laws do not violate the DCC when the
State shows “it ha[d] no other means to advance a legitimate local interest”). For examples of
discriminatory laws that the Court held were not narrowly tailored to a legitimate local purpose, see
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338–39 (invalidating Oklahoma’s law, which limited the number of minnows
allowed to be sold out of state, as not sufficiently related to the law’s alleged purpose of promoting
wild animal life within the state) and Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353–54 (affirming the invalidation of North
Carolina’s law insofar as it prohibited displaying Washington State apple grades on containers shipped
into North Carolina as discriminatory and not narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in protecting
consumers from fraud and deception). For examples of laws which served a legitimate local purpose,
see Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1933) (denying a suit requesting injunctive relief against
a New York importation order requiring imported cattle to be certified as free from Bang’s disease
because although the law burdened interstate commerce, preventing the spread of disease was a
legitimate state interest) and Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding Maine’s statute
that banned importing baitfish as not violating the Commerce Clause because it served a legitimate
state purpose of protecting in-state fisheries from parasites, which could not be served as well by
nondiscriminatory measures).
46. See Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 479 (2003)
(footnotes omitted) (“The Court has repeatedly stated that free market access and national solidarity
are fundamental ideals under the Commerce Clause. Presumably, the Court’s concern with state
actions designed to favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests is that if such initiatives were
allowed, a return to the ‘economic [b]alkanization’ under the Articles of Confederation would be
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The second principle—preventing undue burdens on interstate
commerce—is best exemplified through the test formulated by the Court in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.47 In this case, the Court, when evaluating the
constitutionality of state laws that affect both intrastate and interstate
commerce, reasoned that the following balancing approach should be applied:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.48
Some scholars are critical of this “undue burden” balancing approach
because it requires courts to evaluate the legitimacy of a state’s interest in
burdening interstate commerce, which in turn requires policy determinations
that courts may be less equipped to make than legislators.49
inevitable. Consequently, where a state regulation inhibits free market access by erecting
unreasonable barriers to commerce solely based on origin, the Court has consistently held that the state
regulation will be subject to the most exacting scrutiny.”).
47. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
48. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). In this case, the Supreme Court reasoned that Arizona’s law that
required companies to operate a $200,000 packing plant within Arizona borders was unconstitutional
despite the state’s interest in identifying its local products for their allegedly superior quality because
the interest was not compelling enough to justify burdening interstate commerce to such an extent.
See id. at 145–46. There are other cases that provide helpful illustrations of the undue burden principle,
which is also sometimes referred to as the clearly excessive principle. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471–74 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of Minnesota’s law
banning the sale of plastic, nonreturnable milk containers as being evenhanded and purposed toward
the state’s legitimate interest of conserving natural resources, ultimately concluding that a
“nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it causes
some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state
industry”).
49. See Felmly, supra note 46, at 482 (“Critics are particularly opposed to the Court’s modern
approach of employing the Pike balancing test to invalidate facially neutral state legislation. The
argument raised most often by those challenging the use of balancing in cases involving evenhanded
statutes is that the weighing of legitimate competing interests is best left either to the legislatures of
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The third DCC principle—prohibiting extraterritorial regulations—holds
that the DCC should invalidate a state law if the law “expressly applies to outof-state commerce or if it has that practical effect, regardless of the
legislature’s intent.”50 This principle is detailed in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Healy v. Beer Institute, where the Court, when considering
whether the amended beer price affirmation provisions of the Connecticut
Liquor Control Act violated the Commerce Clause, reasoned that this
“extraterritorial effects” framework has two components.51 First, Healy
asserted that the Commerce Clause “precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the [s]tate’s borders, whether
or not the commerce has effects within the [s]tate.”52 Second, Healy
contended that “a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a [s]tate exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting
[s]tate’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.”53 The extraterritoriality
principle promotes national economic unity but also recognizes the inherent
sovereignty of each individual state.54
the states or to Congress.”). Another scholar, Professor James McGoldrick, Jr., illuminates the
complex nature of the balancing approach when explaining that the Pike balancing test, derived from
an earlier Supreme Court decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945),
requires an evaluation of eight factors to determine whether the law is unduly burdensome. See James
M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Dormant Commerce Clause: The Endgame—From Southern Pacific to
Tennessee Wine & Spirits—1945 to 2019, 40 PACE L. REV. 44, 59–62 (2019). These factors include,
among others, “the ‘nature and extent of the burden’ on interstate commerce,” the “nature and extent
of the state and local interests burdening interstate commerce,” whether “state and local laws [are]
politically self-correcting,” federal legislation from Congress indicating its desires concerning the
specific field, and the existence of “reasonable alternatives to advance[] the legitimate state interest
without undue harm to interstate commerce.” Id. at 60–61. Unlike Felmly’s concerns, McGoldrick
believes the Court is skilled at evaluating the factors in the Pike or Southern Pacific tests. See id. at
125.
50. Stephen McConnell, Don’t Sleep on the Dormant Commerce Clause, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Apr.
25, 2018), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2018/04/dont-sleep-on-the-dormant-commerceclause.html.
51. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also infra notes 53–54 and
accompanying text.
52. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)).
53. Id. In Healy, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Connecticut statute undeniably
had the extraterritorial effect of controlling activity occurring wholly outside the State’s boundary and
was consequently struck down as unconstitutional. See id. at 337, 343.
54. See id. at 335–36 (footnote omitted) (holding that state regulations that have extraterritorial
effects run contrary to the Constitution’s “special concern both with the maintenance of a national
economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the
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Collectively, these three principles—promoting nondiscriminatory
legislation, preventing undue burdens, and prohibiting extraterritorial
regulations—guide the Supreme Court’s decision-making in its DCC
jurisprudence, which in turn guides lower courts.55
B. Ninth Circuit Applying the DCC in the Twenty-First Century
The Ninth Circuit addressed several DCC challenges related to
California’s legislative decisions in the past decade, which illuminate the
court’s recent decisions concerning California Proposition 12’s legitimacy.56
In National Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit
upheld California’s law against a DCC challenge.57 The law prohibited
opticians and optical companies from offering prescription eyewear and from
advertising the availability of eyewear and examinations at the same
location.58 Notably, National Optometrists reasoned that in “the absence of
discrimination or another substantial burden on interstate commerce, [courts]
need not determine if the benefits of a statute are illusory.”59 This conclusion
confined Pike to examining the law’s alleged benefits only if there is a
significant burden on interstate commerce without considering its
extraterritorial effects.60

autonomy of the individual [s]tates within their respective spheres”).
55. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91 (2018); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; see also discussion infra Section II.B.
56. See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C. There were other DCC challenges in other states
within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction during this period, but they are not the focus of this Note. See,
e.g., Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 731 F.3d 843, 847, 849 (9th Cir.
2013) (upholding Washington’s regulation permitting hospitals to perform certain nonsurgical
procedures to treat coronary heart disease only if they have a minimum volume of 300 procedures as
not in conflict with the DCC because any loss of business does not unduly burden interstate commerce
and the regulation promotes the state’s legitimate interest of patient safety).
57. See Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris (National Optometrists), 682 F.3d 1144,
1145–46 (9th Cir. 2012).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1156.
60. See id. at 1155 (“[Pike] does not mention actual benefits as part of the test for determining
when a regulation violates the [D]ormant Commerce Clause. Even if Pike’s ‘clearly excessive’ burden
test were concerned with weighing actual benefits rather than ‘putative benefits,’ we need not examine
the benefits of the challenged laws because, as discussed above, the challenged laws do not impose a
significant burden on interstate commerce. . . . Accordingly, where, as here, there is no discrimination
and there is no significant burden on interstate commerce, we need not examine the actual or putative
benefits of the challenged statutes.”). In its reasoning, National Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1155, drew
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In particular, several of California’s environmental and animal laws have
been placed under the Ninth Circuit’s DCC microscope.61 In Rocky Mountain
I and Rocky Mountain II, the Ninth Circuit considered several challenges to
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) laws as allegedly
discriminating against interstate commerce.62 In Rocky Mountain I, the Ninth
Circuit upheld California’s LCFS laws, which imposed an annual cap on the
average carbon intensity of fuel sold within the state, reasoning that the
regulations did not benefit in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state
interests.63 In Rocky Mountain II, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar
challenge to California’s LCFS laws, which had been amended slightly
regarding the process of assigning carbon intensity values to non-crude oil
fuels.64 The court upheld the law in part because California’s regulation both
was nondiscriminatory and was “aimed at salient environmental differences
between different types of fuels . . . which genuinely reflect[ed] legitimate
state interests . . . [rather than] disguised economic protectionism.”65
The Ninth Circuit also addressed two DCC challenges to animal welfare
legislation in the past ten years in Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris
support from Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125–29 (1978), for the notion that
it need not consider the statute’s purported or actual benefits when the statute is not discriminatory or
unduly burdensome. But Exxon Corp., at least at a cursory level, considered the legitimacy of benefits
gained under Maryland’s new statute, holding that “it bears a reasonable relation to the State’s
legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market,” even though the law was not
discriminatory or impermissibly burdensome. 437 U.S. at 125, 127 (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Pike test, when using “legitimate local public interest” language, undoubtedly assesses the law’s
potential benefits, even if superficially, when the law is evenhanded and not “clearly excessive.” See
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
61. See infra notes 62–79 and accompanying text.
62. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain I), 730 F.3d 1070, 1077–78
(9th Cir. 2013); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain II), 913 F.3d 940, 944–
45 (9th Cir. 2019).
63. See Rocky Mountain I, 730 F.3d at 1089. Further, Rocky Mountain I held the law did not
discriminate against out-of-state ethanol because it “does not base its treatment on a fuel’s origin but
on its carbon intensity.” Id. The court also held the law did not have an extraterritorial effect because
it simply “encourages the use of cleaner fuels through a market system of credits and caps.” Id. at
1103 (quoting Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1065 (E.D. Cal.
2011)). Unlike in National Optometrists, Rocky Mountain I reasoned that even if the ethanol
provisions do not discriminate in purpose or effect, the Pike balancing test should be applied. See id.
at 1107. A request for rehearing Rocky Mountain I en banc was denied, 740 F.3d 507, 508 (9th Cir.
2014), and a petition for certiorari was also denied. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
573 U.S. 946, 946 (2014).
64. See Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d 940; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
65. Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d at 957.
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and Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris.66 In
Chinatown, the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to California’s Shark Fin
Law, “which makes it a misdemeanor to possess, sell, trade, or distribute
detached shark fins in California.”67 The court ultimately held that the law
was not preempted under federal law and did not violate the DCC.68
Chinatown first reasoned the Shark Fin Law was not preempted because “no
provision of federal law affirmatively guarantees the right to use or sell shark
fins onshore.”69 It then concluded that the law did not violate the DCC, either
by regulating extraterritorially or substantially burdening interstate
commerce, because the law was found only to regulate in-state conduct.70
Further, the law was not unduly burdensome and did not require a uniform
system of regulation because “conserv[ing] state resources, prevent[ing]
animal cruelty, and protect[ing] wildlife and public health” are, according to
the Ninth Circuit, “legitimate matters of local concern.”71
In Canards I, the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal denying a
preliminary injunction against California’s Force Fed Birds statute.72 In this
case, appellants contended California’s sales ban of products created through
the force feeding of birds to enlarge their livers violated the DCC by
66. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015); Ass’n des
Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris (Canards I), 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013). While
there are multiple district court decisions, appeals, and motions for reconsideration stemming from
challenges to the California statute in question in Canards I, only three will be discussed for purposes
of this Note: Canards I will refer to the first Ninth Circuit decision; Canards II will refer to the second
Ninth Circuit decision, Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140
(9th Cir. 2017), which held that the California statute was not expressly or impliedly preempted by
federal law; and Canards District will refer to a recent district court decision regarding this statute,
which in part granted plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment interpreting the statute’s scope, but
the decision has been appealed as of September 10, 2020. See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies
du Quebec v. Harris, No. 12-cv-05735-SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 5049182, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020),
appeal docketed, No. 20-55944 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020).
67. Chinatown, 794 F.3d at 1140; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
68. See Chinatown, 794 F.3d at 1139. This was not the first appeal in this case, as the Ninth Circuit
two years prior in Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Brown, affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the Shark Fin Law. 539 F. App’x 761, 763 (9th Cir. 2013). The
court held the district court did not abuse its discretion when ignoring broader arguments as to how
the challenged law burdens interstate commerce, concluding that “[t]he district court can consider the
broader [D]ormant Commerce Clause arguments when deciding whether to issue a permanent
injunction.” Id.
69. Chinatown, 794 F.3d at 1145.
70. See id. at 1145–47.
71. Id. at 1147.
72. See Canards I, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013); see also infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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discriminating against interstate commerce, substantially burdening interstate
commerce, and regulating extraterritorial conduct.73 Applying the abuse of
discretion standard of review,74 the Ninth Circuit held the district court did not
abuse its discretion because it was not discriminatory in banning the sale of
“both intrastate and interstate products that are the result of force feeding a
bird.”75 Further, the court reasoned the statute is not extraterritorial
legislation, because it bans the sale of products by all producers, and
contended it does not substantially burden interstate commerce.76 The court
concluded plaintiffs had not shown the statute completely bans foie gras or
that foie gras required national, uniform production.77
As seen above, the Ninth Circuit is relatively deferential to California’s
73. See Canards I, 729 F.3d at 947, 949. The law in question, section 25982 of the California
Health and Safety Code, states the following: “A product may not be sold in California if it is the result
of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size.” CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25982 (West 2012); Canards I, 729 F.3d at 942.
74. See Canards I, 729 F.3d at 944 (“We review a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion and the underlying legal principles de novo.”). Canards I articulated
the preliminary injunction factors from the Supreme Court’s Winter decision, which held that a
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that “(1) he is ‘likely to succeed on the merits’;
(2) he is ‘likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief’; (3) ‘the balance of
equities tips in his favor’; and (4) ‘an injunction is in the public interest.’” Id. (quoting Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Notably, Canards I held that if the plaintiff cannot
satisfy the first Winter factor, the remaining three do not need to be considered. Id.
75. Id. at 948.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 948–52. Significantly, Canards I narrowed the application of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Healy and Baldwin, both of which examined laws that had practical effects of controlling
conduct outside of the respective state’s borders, stating that “the Court has held that Healy and
Baldwin are not applicable to a statute that does not dictate the price of a product and does not ‘tie the
price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.’” Id. at 951. Other authors note how the foie gras
ban, while encouraging healthy discussion, has not been readily enforced and thus may be more
symbolic than practical in prohibiting animal cruelty. See Max Shapiro, A Wild Goose Chase:
California’s Attempt To Regulate Morality by Banning the Sale of One Food Product, 35 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 27, 52–53 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (“The California foie gras ban went
into effect July 1, 2012. However, this has not stopped Californians from eating foie gras. One
restaurant is still serving foie gras because it claims that the ban does not apply to restaurants on federal
property. Some restaurants are serving foie gras for free, and others are preparing foie gras that
customers bring in themselves. These restaurants claim they can do this because the ban does not
expressly prohibit distribution. There are also practical barriers to enforcement. For example, it is
unclear who is charged with enforcing the ban. Thus, state agencies have little power to control defiant
chefs and diners because of tight budgets and unclear statutory wording.”). As discussed later,
Canards I is an example of the significant narrowing of extraterritoriality doctrine reflected within the
Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence that potentially undermines the DCC’s goal of prohibiting economic
balkanization. See discussion infra Section V.B.
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legislative decisions, but it has invalidated laws on DCC grounds when
California’s legislation clearly attempts to regulate conduct outside of its
borders.78 Nevertheless, California’s legislation concerning farm animals,
such as Propositions 2 and 12, continues to raise complicated questions of
whether animal welfare is a legitimate local interest to burden interstate
commerce.79
C. Animal Welfare Legislation Gives Rise to New Commerce Challenges in
California
In the past twenty years, animal welfare has become a popular topic due
to the proliferation of documentaries and films exposing inhumane practices
in the farming industry.80

78. See, e.g., Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith, 889 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2018); Sam Francis
Found. v. Christies, Inc. (Christie’s), 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In Christie’s,
the Ninth Circuit invalidated a portion of California’s Resale Royalty Act royalty provision, which
requires fine art sellers to pay the artist a 5% royalty fee if the seller resides in California or the sale
occurs within the state, as violating the DCC’s exterritoriality principles as to the extent that the law
regulates sales outside of its borders. 784 F.3d at 1322. Further, the court reasoned that under Healy,
this portion of the Act is unconstitutional because “the Commerce Clause precludes the application of
a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the [s]tate’s borders.” Id. at 1323–25
(quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). In Sharpsmart, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s granting of a preliminary injunction against California’s Medical Waste
Management Act, which required medical waste transported outside of the state to be “consigned to a
permitted medical waste treatment facility in the receiving state.” 889 F.3d at 612. The court’s
affirmance was based on extraterritorial grounds that “California has attempted to regulate waste
treatment everywhere in the country,” ultimately concluding that “[California] cannot be permitted to
dictate what other states must do within their own borders.” Id. at 615–16. However, the court
reversed as to the qualified immunity question for the state officials, holding that since it was not
clearly established that this challenged law violated the DCC, a reasonable official could reasonably
believe “that the Department could control what was done with California waste in another state.” Id.
at 617–18. This ultimately leaves plaintiffs with no financial recourse, an important fact to the Nami
implications below. See discussion infra Section V.B.
79. See CAL. PROP. 2, § 2 (2008); CAL. PROP. 12, § 2 (2018); see also discussion infra Part III.
80. See, e.g., Josephine Yurcaba, Watch This Powerful Documentary Featuring One Perdue
Chicken Farmer Taking on a Cruel Industry, ONE GREEN PLANET (2014),
https://www.onegreenplanet.org/news/perdue-chicken-farmer-documentary-battles-the-industry/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021); Mercy for Animals, Farm to Fridge - The Truth Behind Meat Production,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THIODWTqx5E; POV, Food, Inc.Documentary
Film
Trailer,
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
1,
2010),
HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=OQZJC-ENRL8.
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1. Proposition 2: California Becomes Pro-Hens
In 2008, California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 2, The
Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, by a margin of approximately 63–
37%,81 which added Sections 25990 through 25994 to California’s Health and
Safety Code.82 This proposition limited the cruel confinement of farm animals
within California’s borders, with particular protections for pigs, calves, and
egg-laying hens.83 On its face, Proposition 2 was purposed “to prohibit the
cruel confinement of farm animals in a manner that does not allow them to
turn around freely, lie down, stand up, and fully extend their limbs,” and the
law imposed requirements on noncompliant California farmers to restructure
their current confinement practices by 2015.84 While Proposition 2’s fiscal
impact was speculative when enacted, it was clear that this legislative
proposal would have a particularly significant impact on the egg industry.85
Proposition 2 was fiercely debated, which might explain why this proposition
received the highest ballot initiative voter turnout in American history.86
81. Proposition 2, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUD.,
https://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/elections/proposition-2 (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
82. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25994 (West 2015 & 2018).
83. See id.; Proposition 2 Treatment of Farm Animals, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (June 30, 2008,
10:40 AM), https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2008/2_11_2008.pdf (“Beginning January 1, 2015, this measure
prohibits with certain exceptions the confinement on a farm of pregnant pigs, calves raised for veal,
and egg-laying hens in a manner that does not allow them to turn around freely, lie down, stand up,
and fully extend their limbs. Under the measure, any person who violates this law would be guilty of
a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment in county jail for up to six
months.”). Egg-laying hens under this legislation included female domesticated chickens, turkeys,
ducks, geese, and guinea fowls. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25991 (West 2018).
84. CAL. PROP. 2, § 2 (2008); see Proposition 2 Treatment of Farm Animals, supra note 83.
85. See Proposition 2, supra note 81 (“[Proposition 2] would principally apply to the state’s 18
million egg-laying hens. . . . Currently 5 to 8 percent of the eggs produced in the state come from
cage-free chickens. California is responsible for about 6 percent of all of the nation’s table eggs, a
$330 million industry in 2007.”); see also Valerie J. Watnick, The Business and Ethics of Laying Hens:
California’s Groundbreaking Law Goes into Effect on Animal Confinement, 43 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L.
REV. 45, 49 (2016) (“In 2013, nearly eighteen million California hens laid 5.4 billion eggs at a
commercial value of $380 million.”).
86. See generally Paige M. Tomaselli, California’s Proposition 2: Good for Chickens and Good
for
You,
CTR.
FOR
FEED
SAFETY
(Jan.
8,
2015),
https://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/blog/3688/californias-proposition-2-good-for-chickens-andgood-for-you (“At the time, [Proposition 2] received more votes than any other [ballot initiative] in
American history. . . . California’s animal welfare laws reflect a growing concern on the part of
consumers about both the welfare of farm animals and the quality of their food purchases. . . . An
American Humane Association survey revealed that nearly ninety percent of the 2,600 participants
were concerned about farm animal welfare and seventy-four percent of participants were willing to
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Despite the widespread popularity of The Prevention of Farm Animal
Cruelty Act, California legislators did not want the Golden State to simply
serve as a beacon for preventing animal cruelty.87 In 2010, the California
legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1437, which in part extended Proposition
2’s confinement requirements to out-of-state farmers by banning the sale of
egg-laying hens within California that were not confined in accordance with
Proposition 2’s standards.88 Although the bill’s stated purpose was to “protect
California consumers” from foodborne pathogens,89 its legislative history
reveals its true purpose was economic in nature: “to level the playing field”
so out-of-state competitors were subjected to the same confinement standards
as in-state farmers.90 Given the economic ramifications of Proposition 2 and
its progeny, Assembly Bill 1437, both pieces of legislation were placed under
the Ninth Circuit’s microscope.91

spend more for meat, dairy, and eggs that were labeled humanely-raised.”). However, there were
critics. See Daniel A. Sumner et al., Economic Effects of Proposed Restrictions on Egg-laying Hen
Housing
in
California,
U.C.
AGRIC.
ISSUES
CTR.
(July
2008),
https://aic.ucdavis.edu/publications/eggs/egginitiative.pdf (“Based on our analysis reported above,
there would be two major consequences of an effective national ban on eggs produced from hens in
conventional cage housing. First, the cost of egg production would increase substantially throughout
the United States. Second, the implication of higher costs for all producers would be higher farm
prices and a significant increase in wholesale and retail prices facing buyers. . . . With some 18 million
hens in cage housing in California, about 600 new or retrofitted buildings at about 30,000 birds each
would be needed to be constructed within six years. The capital investment required to provide
approved housing for those hens is between $200 million and $800 million dollars. Producers would
also need access to more land. Further, they would face zoning and other regulations that have limited
relocating or expanding facilities for animal agriculture in California.”); George Skelton, Prop. 2 Is
for the Birds, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-2008-oct-20-me-cap20-story.html (“Ryan Armstrong, a third-generation egg farmer
in San Diego County, says he’d be forced out of business if Proposition 2 passes. He currently has
650,000 birds[,] 50,000 cage-free and 600,000 in cages. ‘I don’t have all my eggs in one basket.’ He
estimates that going completely cage-free would cost $20 million for additional land and barns.”).
87. See Proposition 2, supra note 81; see also infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
88. See A.B. 1437, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). As mentioned in the accompanying main
text, part of this enacted bill applied Proposition 2’s requirements to out-of-state farmers, requiring all
shelled eggs to be produced from egg-laying hens in compliance with farming practices set forth in
Proposition 2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25996 (West 2014).
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25995(e) (West 2011).
90. Bill Analysis AB 1437, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS (May 13, 2009),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1401 1450/ab_1437_cfa_20090512_182647_
asm_comm.html. As discussed later, there is reason to suspect that similar legislation, such as
Proposition 12, was designed not to solely promote farming practices that reduce animal suffering but
with an economic focus in mind. See discussion infra Section V.B.
91. See CAL. PROP. 2, § 2 (2008); Cal. A.B. 1437; see also infra notes 92–98 and accompanying
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In Cramer v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal from a
dismissal of a complaint seeking to invalidate Proposition 2 as
unconstitutionally vague for not specifically providing minimum cage
specifications for egg-laying hens.92 Here, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s ruling dismissing the complaint, holding that Proposition 2
“give[s] people of ‘ordinary intelligence’ a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to
understand its requirements.”93 While Proposition 2 did not provide a
specified minimum space requirement for each hen, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned the law did not violate the Due Process Clause because the amount
of space each hen needed for farmers to comply with Proposition 2 could be
“readily discerned with objective criteria.”94

text. Besides the Ninth Circuit appeals, Missouri, Nebraska, Alabama, Oklahoma, Iowa, Arkansas,
Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin filed an original
jurisdiction action in the Supreme Court, alleging AB 1437 violated the DCC because it was
protectionist legislation designed solely to regulate conduct outside of California. See Motion for
Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1–2, Missouri v. California, 138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018) (No. 22O148).
While the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to express the government’s views on the case
in Missouri v. California, 138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018), the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint was
denied, although Justice Thomas would have granted the motion. See Missouri v. California, 139 S.
Ct. 859 (2019); Louis Cholden-Brown, Symposium: The Commerce Clause and the Global Economy:
Missouri and Indiana Lay an Egg: Why the Latest Attempt at Invalidating State Factory Farm
Regulations Must Fail, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 176–77 (2019).
92. See Cramer v. Harris, 591 F. App’x 634, 634–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.). The Ninth Circuit
held the standard to be applied for a vagueness challenge was that Proposition 2 “must ‘give a person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly.’” Id. at 635 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)); see Carla
Hall, Opinion: Egg-laying Hens in California Win Another Court Battle, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015,
2:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-egg-hens-california-court-20150204story.html (“[I]nstead of retrofitting barns to insure they can comply, farmers—and state attorneys
general from other states—have spent time and money in court railing against this new law (and a
companion law, AB 1437, which requires eggs from out-of-state that are sold in California must come
from hens housed under conditions that comply with Proposition 2). Yes, it is costly to retrofit farms,
but they’re being retrofitted only to a fairly modest new standard of humane treatment. The older
method left hens barely able to move in tiny cages.”).
93. Cramer, 591 F. App’x at 635. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since the law provided clear
requirements that “‘a person shall not tether or confine’ chickens in a manner that prevents them from
either ‘fully spreading both wings without touching the side of an enclosure or other egg-laying hens’
or ‘turning in a complete circle without any impediment, including a tether, and without touching the
side of an enclosure,’” it was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25990–25991 (West 2018)).
94. Id. (“All Proposition 2 requires is that each chicken be able to extend its limbs fully and turn
around freely. . . . Because hens have a wing span and a turning radius that can be observed and
measured, a person of reasonable intelligence can determine the dimensions of an appropriate
confinement that will comply with Proposition 2.”).
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Less than two years later, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge from
six states—Missouri, Nebraska, Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Iowa—
seeking to prohibit the enforcement of AB 1437 and Section 1350(d)(1) of the
California Code, collectively known as the “Shell Egg Laws.”95 The states
argued that the laws violated the DCC and were preempted by federal law.96
In this case, Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of the states’ complaint, holding that the state actors lacked parens
patriae standing to bring the challenged action in part because the alleged
harm to egg companies could be remedied through a private suit, any
fluctuations in egg prices were merely speculative, and the law was not so
discriminatory as to violate the Commerce Clause.97 Proposition 2’s survival
undoubtedly encouraged similar legislation in other states, like
Massachusetts, and more extensive reform within California, to mandate more
robust reform to living conditions for farm animals.98

95. See Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2017); see also infra note 97
and accompanying text.
96. See Koster, 847 F.3d at 650.
97. See id. at 651–55. In order to establish parens patriae standing, petitioners needed to satisfy
the three Article III standing requirements (i.e., concrete injury, traceable to the challenged action, and
redressable by a favorable ruling), plus two additional requirements: the State must be more than a
nominal party, meaning the State must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular
private parties,” and “must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Id. at 651. Because petitioners failed
to articulate a distinguishable interest apart from private parties, the court did not consider issues of
ripeness or a quasi-sovereign interest. See id. Particularly relevant for purposes of this Note, this
court held that these challenged statutes were not discriminatory against interstate commerce, citing
to Canards I for the notion that “[a] statute that treats ‘both intrastate and interstate products’ alike ‘is
not discriminatory.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Canards I, 729 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2013)).
98. See Cholden-Brown, supra note 91, at 177 (footnotes omitted) (“On November 8, 2016,
Massachusetts, at a public referendum by a margin of 77.7% to 22.3%, adopted ‘An Act to Prevent
Cruelty to Farm Animals[,]’ which prohibited the sale in Massachusetts, after January 1, 2022, of
certain eggs, veal, and pork based on the conditions in which the animals were confined. The stated
primary purpose of the legislation was ‘to prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of
farm animal confinement which also threaten the health and safety of Massachusetts consumers,
increase the risk of foodborne illness, and have negative fiscal impacts on the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.’”); David A. Lieb, Supreme Court Won’t Preside over Challenge to State Egg Laws,
WFYI INDIANAPOLIS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/supreme-court-wontpreside-over-challenge-to-state-egg-laws (“California voters in November approved an even more
aggressive law. It will require all eggs sold in the state to come from cage-free hens by 2022. It also
bans the sale of pork and veal from animals that are not raised according to new minimum living space
requirements.”).
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2. Proposition 12: Expanding Animal Protections and Problems
In 2018, California voters expanded on the provisions of Proposition 2 by
passing Proposition 12, The Prevention of Cruelty to Farm Animals Act,
which amended Sections 25990 through 25993 of the California Health and
Safety Code and introduced Section 25993.1.99 Like Proposition 2,
Proposition 12 was popular among voters, with almost 63% voting in favor of
it.100 Its stated purpose was “to prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme
methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the health and
safety of California consumers, and increase the risk of foodborne illness and
associated negative fiscal impacts on the State of California.”101
Proposition 12 codified minimum space requirements based on square
feet for calves raised for veal, breeding pigs, and egg-laying hens, as well as
banned the sale of veal from calves, pork from breeding pigs, and eggs from
hens, inside or outside of California’s borders, when such animals were
confined to areas below the legislation’s minimum square feet
requirements.102 The legislation was designed to be implemented within a
two-tier system, where starting in 2020, farmers selling egg products and veal
products in California were required to provide a minimum of one square foot
of usable floor space for their egg-laying hens and forty-three square feet of
usable floor space for calves raised for veal; starting in 2022, farmers can only
sell whole pork meat in California if they provide twenty-four square feet of
usable floor space for each breeding pig and egg products in California if the
farmers provide cage-free housing for egg-laying hens.103 However,

99. See CAL. PROP. 12, § 2 (2018); N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No. 219CV08569CASFFMX,
2020 WL 919153, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020).
100. See SEC’Y OF STATE ALEX PADILLA, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 6, 2018 GENERAL
ELECTION 16 (2018), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2018-general/sov/2018-complete-sov.pdf.
101. CAL. PROP. 12, § 2 (2018). Despite this claim, Proposition 12 did not include any scientific
studies or legislative findings demonstrating a link between these legislative changes and a reduced
risk of foodborne illness in California. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5–6.
102. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25993.1 (West 2018). For a helpful document
showing the differences between Proposition 2 and Proposition 12, see Cheri Shankar, Request for
Title and Summary for Proposed Initiative Statute, INITIATIVE COORDINATOR ATT’Y GEN.’S OFF.,
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-0026%20%28Animal%20
Cruelty%29_0.pdf.
103. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25991(e) (West 2018). Under this chapter, a “cage-free
housing system” must permit the hens to live in an indoor or outdoor controlled environment where
they “are free to roam unrestricted” and are “provided enrichments that allow them to exhibit natural
behavior,” among other things. Id. § 25991(c). Usable floorspace is calculated by dividing the total
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California, at the time the legislation was enacted, “ha[d] yet to issue
regulations implementing Proposition 12 despite the statutory deadline to do
so by September 1, 2019.”104 In 2021, the California Department of
Agriculture finally released the proposed implementation details for
Proposition 12, nearly two years after the statutory deadline.105
Proposition 12, like its Proposition 2 predecessor, was subject to fierce
debate, but in this case, both sides received support from animal welfare
groups.106 Although the Humane Society saw Proposition 12 as a
commendable step towards improving the livelihood of farm animals,107
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) contended that
Proposition 12 did not go far enough because it ultimately misleads California
voters into thinking they are meaningfully improving the lives of farm
animals.108 As with Proposition 2, some opponents took their disapproval
with Proposition 12 further by filing lawsuits seeking to invalidate the
legislation.109
On December 5, 2019, the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) filed
a declaratory judgment action against Karen Ross, California Secretary of the
square footage of floorspace by the number of animals in said enclosure. See id. § 25991(s). For the
official language of the sales ban, which is the main component challenged in Nami, see discussion
infra Part III.
104. N. Am. Meat Inst., 2020 WL 919153, at *3.
105. See Tyne Morgan, Report Shows California’s Prop 12 Could Increase Sow Deaths, Create
Costly
Pork
for
Consumers,
AG
WEB
(June
8,
2021),
https://www.agweb.com/news/livestock/pork/report-shows-californias-prop-12-could-increase-sowdeaths-create-costly-pork (“CDFA released the details of Prop 12 in a notice posted nearly two years
after it was originally due. It goes back to a ballot initiative passed in California in 2018. The new
guidelines are set to take effect in 2022. The Meat Institute said after reviewing the details, the
proposed rule could not only increase mortality rates but may add nearly $100,000 in costs per year
for a typical breeding farm.”).
106. See PROP. 12, § 2; infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
107. See Andrew O’Reilly, California Ballot Measure on Cage-Free Rules Divides Activists,
Farmers, FOX NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/california-ballot-measureseeks-to-define-what-it-means-to-be-cage-free (“The Humane Society, which spearheaded the push
for Proposition 12, argues that minimum space standards for the chickens—along with those for
breeding pigs and calves raised for veal—would mark a huge step in animal welfare.”).
108. See id. (“More hardline animal rights groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
better known as PETA, say that the measure is a step backward at a time when more and more
companies are already requiring hens to be cage-free amid a rising demand from consumers. The
organization argues that the measure would only represent a small improvement over current
conditions and misleads consumers who buy cage-free eggs into thinking they’re doing something
humane for animals.”).
109. See PROP. 12, § 2; infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
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Department of Food and Agriculture, among other officials.110 In their
complaint, NPPC alleged that Proposition 12’s amendment of California’s
Health and Safety Code to forbid sales of pork from sows not housed in
conformity with the code’s requirements violates the Commerce Clause.111 In
response, several animal organizations, led by the Humane Society of the
United States, intervened as defendants in the National Pork litigation.112 The
district court ultimately granted the Defendant’s later motion to dismiss the
complaint, concluding, “Proposition 12 does not regulate extraterritorially
because it does not target solely interstate commerce and . . . regulates in-state
and out-of-state conduct equally. Although there are upstream effects on outof-state producers, those effects are a result of regulating in-state conduct.”113
The National Pork lawsuit was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where
appellants and several amici, including the United States and twenty state
attorneys general, argued that Proposition 12 should be invalidated for
violating the DCC, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.114
110. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Cal.
2020), aff’d, 6 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No.21-468 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2021); see
also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
111. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 70, Nat’l Pork, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1201
(No. 19-02324); see also NPPC, AFBF File Legal Challenge to California’s Proposition 12, FARM
BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.fb.org/newsroom/nppc-afbf-file-legal-challenge-to-californiasproposition-12 (“California represents approximately 15% of the U.S. pork market, and Proposition
12 will force hog farmers who want to sell pork into the populous state to switch to alternative housing
systems, at a significant cost to their business. . . . Currently, less than 1% of U.S. pork production
meets Prop 12’s requirements.”).
112. See Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Unopposed Motion to Intervene at 1, Nat’l Pork, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (No. 19-02324). In their motion
to intervene, the Humane Society argued that they have a “significant protectable interest” in upholding Proposition 12 as the “architects, supporters, and chief proponents of the initiative.” Id. at 10.
Further, they contended that their interests in their broader campaign to “eradicate extreme confinement practices” of animals would be impaired if the legislation was invalidated, see id. at 11, and
argued their interests would not be adequately protected by the State defendants because their interest
is solely for “prevention of cruelty to animals and the interests of their members,” id. at 13.
113. Nat’l Pork, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 1208. The district court also held that “[p]laintiffs have failed
to demonstrate that there is a substantial burden on interstate commerce. As such, the Court need not
determine whether the benefits of the challenged law are illusory.” Id. at 1210.
114. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 6 F.4th 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Todd
Neeley, Commerce Clause on Center Stage: 20 States, Industry Groups Join Appeal Against California’s Proposition 12, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (Oct. 7, 2020, 10:50 AM), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/article/2020/10/07/20-states-industry-groups-join-12 (“The ag groups have been
joined in the lawsuit by the states of Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
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Concurrently with the National Pork lawsuit, NAMI filed a suit that
challenged the validity of Proposition 12 on multiple DCC grounds.115 The
Nami decision is significant due to its bearing on the competing interests of
state sovereignty, federalism, and economic unity on an unsettled topic—
whether states can burden interstate commerce to promote animal welfare
legislation.116
III. NAMI: MEAT PRODUCERS SEEK TO PREEMPTIVELY GUT CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION
NAMI, an organization whose members account for more than ninetyfive percent of the United States’ output of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey, and
processed meat products, filed a lawsuit in the Central District of California.117
NAMI’s complaint sought declaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive
relief against Proposition 12 primarily on the basis that the legislation violates
the DCC.118 In its complaint, NAMI noted that while Proposition 12 was
Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia[,] and Wyoming. . . . Amici have a strong interest in this case
because Proposition 12 regulates the conduct of farmers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers nationwide[, as] . . . California has proposed regulations that would permit California officials to conduct
on-site inspections in other states and would impose onerous record-keeping requirements on out-ofstate farmers. . . . [California] needs about 700,000 sows to satisfy its pork demand. About 1,500 out
of California’s 8,000 sows are used in commercial breeding housed in small farms. The NPPC has
argued because the state has to import most of its sows, Proposition 12 essentially regulates farmers
beyond state borders.”); Ryan McCarthy, NPPC, AFBF Head to Appeals Court Over Prop 12, MEAT
+ POULTRY (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/23861-nppc-afbf-head-to-appeals-court-over-prop-12 (“Proposition 12 . . . achieves no consumer-health benefit at all—though that
was touted to voters as one of its goals—and far exceeds any right of California to determine what its
own citizens eat by regulating as a practical matter how pork is produced nationwide.”). In its decision, the Ninth Circuit predicted that the DCC will ultimately become a legal fiction of the past that
will no longer be applicable to bind state legislative authority. See Nat’l Pork, 6 F.4th at 1033 (“While
the [D]ormant Commerce Clause is not yet a dead letter, it is moving in that direction.”).
115. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 825 F.
App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021); see also infra note 116 and accompanying text.
116. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014; see also discussion infra Parts III, IV, V.
117. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
118. See Complaint for Declaratory & Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief at 14, N. Am.
Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014 . All of the Complaint’s arguments were focused on the application
of Proposition 12 to the sale of pork and veal from outside of California as being unconstitutional
while not addressing the sales ban as applied to shelled or liquid eggs. See id. The specific relief
requested in the Complaint was:
A declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Proposition 12’s
sales ban, as applied to veal and pork from outside California, violates the
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framed as an attempt to prevent animal cruelty by eliminating confinement
methods that threaten the health of California consumers and increase the risk
of foodborne illness, the legislation was not accompanied by any supporting
evidence.119 The main portion of Proposition 12 under scrutiny is the “sales
ban,” Section 25990(b) of the California Health and Safety Code:
(b) A business owner or operator shall not knowingly engage
in the sale within the State [of California] of any of the
following: (1) Whole veal meat that the business owner or
operator knows or should know is the meat of a covered
animal who was confined in a cruel manner. (2) Whole pork
meat that the business owner or operator knows or should
know is the meat of a covered animal who was confined in a
cruel manner, or is the meat of immediate offspring of a
covered animal who was confined in a cruel manner. (3)
Shell egg that the business owner or operator knows or
should know is the product of a covered animal who was
confined in a cruel manner. (4) Liquid eggs that the business
owner or operator knows or should know are the product of
a covered animal who was confined in a cruel manner.120

United States Constitution and is unenforceable; [a] preliminary and permanent
injunction enjoining the Defendants from implementing or enforcing the sales
ban as applied to veal or pork from outside of California; [a]n order awarding
Plaintiff its costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and [s]uch
other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Id. at 14–15. Furthermore, the complaint alleged that injunctive relief was proper because “[t]he Meat
Institute [had] no adequate remedy at law.” Id. at 12.
119. See id. at 4–5. Additionally, the Complaint drew a comparison between Proposition 12 and
the assembly hearing for AB 1437, the Shell Egg Law, which noted that the law was seeking to apply
the egg-laying hen confinements of Proposition 2 to out-of-state producers to level the economic
playing field. See id. at 4. The purpose of this comparison was to make the subtle assertion that
Proposition 12 is similarly economic protectionist legislation, rather than truly concerned with the
well-being of animals. See id.
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990(b) (West 2018). Under this revision of the California
Code, which is designed to avoid federal preemption, a sale refers to “a commercial sale by a business
that sells any item covered by this chapter, but does not include any sale undertaken at an establishment
at which mandatory inspection is provided under the Federal Meat Inspection Act,” which likely
reflects its desire to avoid preemption by federal law. Id. § 25991(o). In terms of the location of a
sale, this amendment provides that a sale is “deemed to occur at the location where the buyer takes
physical possession of [a covered] item.” Id. A covered item refers to covered animals, meaning “any
calf raised for veal, breeding pig, or egg-laying hen who is kept on a farm.” Id. § 25991(f).
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NAMI contended that Proposition 12’s sales ban should be rendered
unconstitutional for three reasons.121 First, Proposition 12 violated the DCC
because it discriminates against “out-of-state producers, distributers and
sellers of pork and veal.”122 Second, Proposition 12’s sales ban violated the
DCC because the legislation conflicts with the Clause’s “prohibition on
extraterritorial state legislation.”123 Third, Proposition 12’s sales ban violated
the DCC by “imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign
commerce that are clearly excessive when measured against any legitimate
local benefits.”124
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the Humane Society of the United
121. See Complaint for Declaratory & Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 118,
at 8–14; see also infra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
122. Complaint for Declaratory & Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 118, at
8. In particular, NAMI contended that the sales ban is discriminatory:
[The sales ban] operates as an impermissible protectionist trade barrier,
blocking the flow of goods in interstate commerce unless out-of-state producers
comply with California’s regulations. . . . California has no legitimate local
interest in how farm animals are housed in other [s]tates and countries. . . . If
[California] is concerned that the prohibited sales pose a health and safety risk
not already adequately addressed by the [Federal Meat Inspection Act], it can
subject whole pork and veal meat imported into the [s]tate to additional
inspection at the point of sale to consumers.
Id. at 8–11.
123. Id. at 11. In particular, the complaint contended that the challenged legislation constitutes
impermissible extraterritorial legislation:
Proposition 12 dictates farming practices in other [s]tates by conditioning the
sale of imported pork and veal in California on adherence to California’s
confinement requirements upon pain of criminal or civil penalty. . . . California
cannot use the in-state sale of a product as a jurisdictional “hook” to regulate
upstream commercial practices that occur in other [s]tates simply because
California finds those practices objectionable. The unconstitutionality of
Proposition 12’s sales ban is further confirmed because if every [s]tate enacted
a similar sales ban, producers would be forced to choose between complying
with the most restrictive confinement regulation, segregating their operations
to serve different [s]tates, or abandoning certain markets altogether.
Id. at 11–12.
124. Id. at 13. The complaint further alleged that Proposition 12’s sales ban
will cost the veal and pork industries hundreds of millions of dollars . . . and
may close off the California market to a large swath of integrated producers and
the independent farmers upon which they rely to provide whole pork to their
customers in California. . . . California has no legitimate local interest in
regulating farming conditions in other [s]tates and countries.
Id. at 13–14.
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States and others moved to intervene as defendant-intervenors, contending
that they would be directly impacted by the outcome of the lawsuit.125 At a
hearing, the district court granted the Humane Society’s motion to intervene,
as well as addressed NAMI’s motion for a preliminary injunction.126
In its opinion addressing NAMI’s motion for preliminary injunctive
relief, the district court articulated the applicable standard as follows: “A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”127 Addressing the Commerce Clause
arguments, the district court was unpersuaded by NAMI’s argument that
Proposition 12, like AB 1437, has a discriminatory purpose because it is
designed to level the economic playing field.128 The court noted that the
committee’s stated purpose is primarily to promote animal welfare and
prevent foodborne bacteria.129 The district court also rejected NAMI’s
discriminatory effect claim that Proposition 12 operates as a protectionist
trade barrier, holding that “what NAMI characteriz[ed] as a competitive
advantage [was] ultimately just a preferred method of production.”130
Addressing the extraterritoriality claim, the district court contended that
the Supreme Court has held that the extraterritoriality principle is generally
only applicable to cases involving price-setting statutes, such as in Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor

125. See Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (No.
19-08569), aff’d, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021).
126. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
127. Id. at 1020 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2009)). As discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion concerning preliminary injunctions in
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008), the district court noted that
a preliminary injunction constitutes an “extraordinary remedy.” N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at
1020.
128. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1024–25.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1027. The district court also contended that NAMI’s argument that Proposition 12 is
discriminatory because in-state farmers had more “lead time” to make structural adjustments to their
animal confinement operations is without merit. See id. at 1028. While conceding that Proposition
12 could be discriminatory in effect if regulations passed to implement Proposition 12 exempt “bob”
veal from the sales ban because it is culled primarily from California dairy farms, the district court
held this argument was premature at the preliminary injunction stage and accordingly was insufficient
to warrant granting a preliminary injunction on these grounds alone. See id. at 1028–29.
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Authority, and Healy.131 However, even if the extraterritoriality principle
applied in a different context, such as the Ninth Circuit had found in Sam
Francis Foundation v. Christies, Inc.,132 the district court concluded that its
application is limited only to cases where the statute regulates conduct taking
place “wholly outside” a state’s borders, not in cases where a statute regulates
in-state conduct with out-of-state practical effects.133 Here, the district court
held that since Proposition 12 is designed to regulate in-state conduct, the
extraterritoriality doctrine is inapplicable.134
In response to NAMI’s substantial burden on interstate commerce claim,
the district court reasoned that statutes do not impose a significant burden on
interstate commerce unless they are inherently discriminatory or purposed to
regulate extraterritorial conduct.135 Thus, NAMI needed to demonstrate
Proposition 12 would create “inconsistent regulation of activities that are
inherently national or require a uniform system of regulation,” which is found
with laws regulating transportation or sports leagues.136 Since Proposition 12
had not been shown to interfere with the flow of veal or pork products, the
court held it simply “preclude[d] a preferred, more profitable method of
operating in a retail market” by directing how, not where, meat products are
produced, and therefore does not constitute a substantial burden on interstate
commerce.137
Next, turning to the other preliminary injunction factors raised in NAMI’s
131. See id. at 1029–30. The district court further elaborated that “the Ninth Circuit has held that
the [extraterritoriality] doctrine is ‘not applicable to a statute that does not dictate the price of a product
and does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.’” Id. at 1030 (quoting
Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2015)).
132. See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
133. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1031.
134. See id. at 1031–32.
135. See id. at 1032.
136. Id. at 1033 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1148
(9th Cir. 2012)).
137. Id. at 1033–34. The district court further stated that “[t]he gravamen of NAMI’s ‘substantial
burden’ argument is therefore ultimately a complaint about the cost of complying with Proposition
12’s requirements. However, ‘demonstrating that state regulations impose substantial costs on
interstate operations is not sufficient to establish a burden calling for balancing under Pike.’” Id. at
1034 (quoting S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 647 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (N.D.
Cal. 1986), aff’d, 830 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1987)). While referencing declarations from NAMI
members that Proposition 12 would cost millions of dollars over many months or even years to
redesign animal facilities, the district court did not consider the economic costs as relevant
considerations in the substantial burden analysis because “the regulation applies evenly no matter
where production takes place.” Id.
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complaint, the district court exercised its discretion not to evaluate them.138
Although Proposition 12 could impose significant costs on some NAMI
members, and despite its recognition that the Eleventh Amendment would
create an irreparable injury once the legislative changes went into effect, the
court reasoned that “there are no serious questions regarding the merits of
NAMI’s constitutional challenge.”139 As a result, the district court denied
NAMI’s motion for a preliminary injunction.140 In response, NAMI decided
to appeal this denial of a preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit.141
While the decision denying NAMI’s request for a preliminary injunction
was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the district court ruled on defendant Xavier
Becerra’s motion to dismiss NAMI’s complaint and defendant-intervenor
Humane Society’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which were filed
shortly after the district court denied NAMI’s request for injunctive relief.142
Applying the “accept[ing] as true all material allegations” standard as required
when considering motions to dismiss,143 the district court ruled NAMI alleged
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that Proposition 12 had a
discriminatory purpose, discriminatory effect, and substantially burdened
interstate commerce.144 The court denied the motions as to those claims and
granted the defendants’ motions as to the extraterritoriality claim but provided

138. See id. at 1034–35.
139. Id. The district court recognized that the Eleventh Amendment, which grants states like
California sovereign immunity against monetary damages unless it waives said immunity, will bar
NAMI from recovering costs should its members decide to change their animal confinement structures
to align with Proposition 12’s mandates while challenging its constitutionality, even if the law is later
struck down as unconstitutional in the face of the DCC. See id. at 1034; see, e.g., Cal. Pharmacists
Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds and
remanded sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606 (2012) (“[I]t is clear
that it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow [California] to continue to violate the
requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies available to compensate
. . . [p]laintiffs for the irreparable harm that would be caused by the continuing violation.”). As
discussed later in this Note, the difficulty with preliminary injunction cases that involve significant
capital, as is the case here, is that laws that may not appear to be clearly unconstitutional and therefore
survive preliminary injunction scrutiny will have a rippling effect on the national economy with no
paths for recourse against the state. See discussion infra Section V.B.
140. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1035.
141. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518, 519 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2854 (2021).
142. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No. 219CV08569CASFFMX, 2020 WL 919153, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 2020).
143. See id. at *3.
144. See id. at *5–9.
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NAMI with leave to amend.145
A. NAMI Takes Its DCC Challenge to the Ninth Circuit
On appeal, NAMI contended that the district court erred in denying its
request for a preliminary injunction against Proposition 12’s sales ban for four
main reasons.146 First, NAMI argued that the sales ban impermissibly
discriminates against interstate commerce because it serves as a protectionist
trade barrier without any legitimate state interest.147 Indeed, NAMI alleged
that the sales ban “strips away the competitive advantage that out-of-state
producers have over in-state producers because their home states have not
imposed the same costly confinement restrictions that California imposes on
its farmers.”148 Second, NAMI asserted that the sales ban constitutes
impermissible extraterritorial state legislation because “[t]he express purpose
and practical effect of the [s]ales [b]an are to ‘phase out’ farming conditions
in other [s]tates and countries that California lacks power to regulate.”149
145. See id. In its decision, the district court applied a very narrow interpretation of the
extraterritoriality principle, contending that binding precedent in Sam Francis Foundation v. Christies,
Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), compelled the conclusion that the extraterritoriality
principle only limits regulations seeking to regulate conduct wholly outside California’s borders. See
N. Am. Meat Inst., 2020 WL 919153, at *7. As discussed later in this Note, this narrow
extraterritoriality approach continually implemented by the Ninth Circuit is problematic. See
discussion infra Section V.B. Its substantial deference to state legislative decisions continues to permit
states like California to effectively regulate the entire economy without any consequence because of
the sovereign immunity afforded to the state under the Eleventh Amendment. See discussion infra
Section V.B.
146. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 519; see also infra notes 147–51 and accompanying
text.
147. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10.
148. Id. In essence, NAMI argued that the sales ban is discriminatory because its intended effect is
to insulate California producers from competition by blocking the flow of goods into the state unless
out-of-state producers make the same costly regulations as in-state producers. See id. at 17–18.
Further, NAMI argued that the sales ban imposes no incremental burden on California producers, since
they are already confined to these prohibitions under Section 25990(a) of the California Health and
Safety Code. See id. at 21. Seeking to distinguish Canards I on the basis that the Ninth Circuit did
not address whether a facially neutral statute complies with the DCC if its “practical and intended
effect is to burden and discriminate against out-of-state competitors,” NAMI argued that when
subjecting the sales ban to scrutiny, California failed to show that the sales ban promotes any legitimate
local interest because the State has no interest in out-of-state animal practices and failed to show any
consumer health interests are actually served. See id. at 22–29.
149. Id. at 10. NAMI contended, contrary to the district court’s ruling, that the extraterritoriality
doctrine retains vitality and is not limited to price-control contexts or legislation seeking to wholly
regulate conduct outside of a state’s borders, given that the Supreme Court has not held anything
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Third, NAMI alleged that the district court abused its discretion in holding the
sales ban does not unduly burden interstate commerce because its express
purpose is to control interstate commerce by compelling out-of-state
competitors to make costly changes to their confinement operations without
any evidence showing the legislation produces a legitimate local benefit.150
Finally, NAMI contended that the district court erred in denying a preliminary
injunction given the irreparable financial harm that accompanies the
legislation, and as a result, the public interest favored granting a preliminary
injunction.151
indicating otherwise. See id. at 35–39. As discussed in greater detail later in this Note, this author
contends that the most significant problem of the Nami decision is what NAMI foreshadows could
occur if their appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction is affirmed: “A contrary conclusion
would allow California and other [s]tates to export their regulatory standards throughout the nation,
balkanize the national economy, and foment trade wars and friction among the [s]tates that the
Constitution was enacted to prevent.” Id. at 10; see discussion infra Section V.B. The States Amici
Brief focuses primarily on this argument as well, contending that Proposition 12 runs contrary to the
intent of the Founding Fathers to prohibit economic balkanization and ultimately violates state
sovereignty by usurping the sovereign police powers of other states. See Amici States Brief, supra
note 4, at 12–14. The National Association of Manufacturers amicus brief raises similar arguments,
contending that:
If California can assert legal control over out-of-[s]tate meat production to
benefit in-[s]tate producers, then North Carolina can do the same when it comes
to Washington’s apple production, and New York can regulate Vermont’s milk
production. And that protectionist impulse is not limited to food. States could
rely on a similar theory to regulate supply chains in virtually any industry.
See Amici Commerce Brief, supra note 5, at 24–25.
150. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 39–40. NAMI contended the sales ban burdens
interstate commerce because it will significantly impair “the free flow of . . . products across state
borders.” Id. at 41 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1154–
55 (9th Cir. 2012)). In terms of fiscal costs, NAMI alleged that its members will have to spend millions
of dollars to comply with this legislation, and unless they engage in a complete overhaul of their barn
spacing, they will have to segregate animals based on compliance and non-compliance with
California’s legislation, which is also burdensome. See id. at 40–42. Additionally, NAMI contended
that the district court erred in dismissing its burden claims as irrelevant because California producers
account for a small portion of the veal and hog market, thereby causing the burden to be placed most
acutely on out-of-state producers. See id. at 42–43. Given these significant economic burdens, the
exemptions for “bob” veal, of which California is a leading producer, and the minimal interest of
California in animal welfare outside of its borders, NAMI contended that the sales ban should be struck
down as violating the DCC. See id. at 42–45.
151. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 51–52. NAMI illuminated the significant weight
of California’s economic market, noting that:
California is an important market for pork products, with more than 39 million
consumers, or 12% of the U.S. market. . . . NAMI’s members and thousands
of independent veal and pork farmers throughout the nation are caught on the
horns of a dilemma. Whichever alternative they select—comply with
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In response to NAMI’s contentions, the state defendants asserted that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying NAMI’s request for a
preliminary injunction for three main reasons.152 First, the state defendants
contended that Proposition 12 does not have a discriminatory purpose because
it applies the same confinement standards to veal and pork sales within its
borders without consideration of the product’s origin.153 Second, the state
defendants argued that Proposition 12 does not constitute impermissible
extraterritorial regulation because the Ninth Circuit holds that state laws
designed to regulate in-state product sales with out-of-state effects are
permissible.154 Third, the state defendants alleged that Proposition 12 does
not regulate activities requiring a uniform system of regulation, and under
Pike balancing, the legislation does not substantially burden interstate
Proposition 12 or exit the California market—will inflict significant financial
and other injuries, none of which are compensable through a damages action
because of California’s sovereign immunity.
Id. at 50–51. Further, NAMI stressed the need for a preliminary injunction to provide additional time
to assess the constitutionality of Proposition 12 in part because the “multi-layered efforts to satisfy
Proposition 12’s requirements would need to begin immediately because producers cannot ‘simply
flip a switch’ and come into compliance.” Id. at 49.
152. See State Defendants Brief, supra note 9, at 7–8; see also infra notes 153–56 and
accompanying text. The Humane Society made similar arguments as the state defendants but also
asserted that NAMI’s “claims of impending doom [were] hyperbolic” because, according to the
Humane Society, their profits might grow by filling the market demand for cruelty-free products, and
Proposition 12 will not create irreparable harm because NAMI members failed to allege any concrete
percentage of business losses as a result of compliance that warranted granting a preliminary
injunction. See Humane Society Brief, supra note 8, at 37–39.
153. See State Defendants Brief, supra note 9, at 7. The state defendants noted that NAMI had
abandoned its argument that Proposition 12 has a discriminatory purpose on appeal and therefore
argued that NAMI had a higher burden to prove the legislation has a discriminatory effect since it is
not “facially discriminatory []or motivated by an impermissible purpose.” See id. at 13 (quoting Int’l
Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015)). The state defendants further argued
NAMI’s assertion that Proposition 12 has a discriminatory effect by “purportedly neutralizing
advantages of favorable regulatory treatment held by producers in other states” [was] without merit,
and since the law is not discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit did not need to decide whether the legislation
survives strict scrutiny. See id. at 16, 21. The state defendants also contended NAMI’s argument that
Proposition 12 has a discriminatory effect by exempting bob veal producers was without merit because
they are not similarly situated to veal producers, and since the exemption is equally applied to all
producers, it is not discriminatory. See id. at 20 n.5.
154. See id. at 8. The state defendants not only asserted that binding intra-circuit precedent only
strikes down laws that seek to regulate conduct that occurs wholly outside of the state’s borders as
impermissible extraterritorial regulation, see id. at 21, but they also discredited NAMI’s arguments
raising concerns about other states responding to Proposition 12 by imposing more stringent
requirements, arguing that this outcome is too speculative to deserve serious attention, see id. at 29–
30.
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commerce.155 Even if it did, the state defendants argued that California’s
considerable interest in preventing animal cruelty outweighs any alleged
burden.156
B. Ninth Circuit Affirms the Denial of a Preliminary Injunction
In its decision, Nami applied the abuse of discretion standard of review,
which limits the Ninth Circuit’s review of the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction and is deferential to the district court’s
determinations.157 In practice, the Ninth Circuit does the following:
We begin by identifying how little we can assist in the final
resolution of the critical issues before the district court.
Until a permanent injunction is granted or denied, we are
foreclosed from fully reviewing the important questions
presented. Review of an order granting or denying
a preliminary injunction is much more limited than review
of an order granting or denying a permanent injunction. At
the preliminary injunction stage, the substantive law aspects
of the district court’s order will be reversed only if the order
rests on an erroneous legal premise and, thus, constitutes an
abuse of discretion; at the permanent injunction stage, we
freely review all conclusions of law. Review of factual
findings at the preliminary injunction stage is, of course,
restricted to the limited and often nontestimonial record
available to the district court when it granted or denied the
injunction motion. The district court’s findings supporting
its order granting or denying a permanent injunction may
differ from its findings at the preliminary injunction stage
because by then presentation of all the evidence has been
155. See id. at 8; see also infra note 156 and accompanying text.
156. See State Defendants Brief, supra note 9, at 8. The state defendants asserted that given the
Ninth Circuit precedent in Canards I, 729 F.3d 937, 952 (9th Cir. 2013), which allows states to
exercise their police powers to prevent practices deemed cruel to animals, the Ninth Circuit should not
second-guess California’s legislative decision-making and accordingly should find that even if
Proposition 12 is burdensome under the Pike test, the State’s interest in preventing animal cruelty
clearly outweighs the alleged burdens. See id. at 33–34.
157. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518, 519 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2854 (2021).
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completed. Then too, our determination whether its
subsequent findings are clearly erroneous may differ from
our view taken at the preliminary stage.158
In Nami, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of NAMI’s request
for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Proposition 12.159
Ultimately, Nami reasoned that the district court “did not abuse its discretion
in holding that NAMI was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its [D]ormant
Commerce Clause claim” and therefore did not err in denying the
injunction.160
First addressing NAMI’s claim that Proposition 12 was not
discriminatory in purpose or effect, Nami held the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that Proposition 12 lacked a discriminatory purpose
because of the lack of evidence suggesting that the legislation was
protectionist in nature.161 Further, Nami reasoned that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in holding Proposition 12 lacked a discriminatory
effect because it “treats in-state meat producers the same as out-of-state meat
producers.”162 Addressing NAMI’s extraterritoriality claim, Nami held that
158. Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 753 F.2d 719, 723–24 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted). The Zepeda court went further in articulating the review framework for whether a district
court abuses its discretion:
A district judge may abuse his discretion in any of three ways: (1) he may apply
incorrect substantive law or an incorrect preliminary injunction standard; (2) he
may rest his decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction on a clearly
erroneous finding of fact that is material to the decision to grant or deny the
injunction; or (3) he may apply an acceptable preliminary injunction standard
in a manner that results in an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 724.
159. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 519.
160. Id.
161. Id. Nami also contended that even NAMI did not argue that Proposition 12 is clearly
discriminatory, stating, “NAMI acknowledges that Proposition 12 is not facially discriminatory.” See
id.
162. Id. It is worth noting that the Nami panel conceded that the case law concerning the DCC is
inconsistent, citing to Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.
Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018), when it deferred to the district court’s decision to rely on Canards I, 729
F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that state legislation has a discriminatory effect only if it
does not treat in-state producers in the same manner as out-of-state producers. See N. Am. Meat Inst.,
825 F. App’x at 519. Although Nami does not provide the text it relies on from Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence, given the citation provided in its decision, Nami was likely referring to the following
portion of his concurrence:
My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our [D]ormant
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“[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Proposition
12 does not directly regulate extraterritorial conduct because it is not a price
control or price affirmation statute.”163
The Nami panel further reasoned that the district court “did not abuse its
discretion in holding that Proposition 12 does not substantially burden
interstate commerce” for two reasons.164 First, Nami reasoned that
“Proposition 12 does not impact an industry that is inherently national or
requires a uniform system of regulation.”165 Second, Nami held that
Proposition 12 does not substantially burden interstate commerce “because
the law precludes sales of meat products produced by a specified method,
rather than imposing a burden on producers based on their geographical

[C]ommerce [C]lause jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for
agreement with all aspects of the doctrine. The Commerce Clause is found in
Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Meanwhile
our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state
laws that offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can
be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or
defended as misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination
imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are
questions for another day.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
163. N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 520. Due to the confining nature of the panel’s scope of
review for preliminary injunction appeals, Nami’s decision regarding the extraterritoriality issue is
unsurprisingly in alignment with previous intra-circuit decisions that implemented a narrow version
of the extraterritoriality doctrine. See generally Canards I, 729 F.3d at 951. This interpretation confined the doctrine’s application to a narrow context that reflects a faulty understanding of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Walsh. See id. (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has held that Healy and Baldwin are not
applicable to a statute that does not dictate the price of a product and does not ‘tie the price of its instate products to out-of-state prices.’” (quoting Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,
669 (2003))). As discussed later in this Note, the continued trend within the Ninth Circuit of permitting
a narrow reading of the extraterritoriality principle is inherently problematic. See discussion infra
Section V.B.
164. N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 520 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) and
Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669–70 (2003)); see infra notes 165–66 and
accompanying text.
165. N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 520 (citing Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d
1008, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 1994)). While Venison Producers was a challenge to Washington State’s ban
of private ownership and exchange of certain exotic wildlife, including certain species of deer, 20 F.3d
at 1010–11, Nami presents a different issue in that the former was concerned with the preservation of
wildlife within its borders against certain documented infectious diseases, while the sales ban here was
concerned with farming practices taking place outside of its borders, which places doubt on the true
purposes of Proposition 12 since it was not accompanied by any scientific findings showing it
promotes public health. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5–6.
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origin.”166 Accordingly, Nami reasoned that NAMI was unlikely to “succeed
on the merits.”167 Therefore, Nami held that “the district court did not err
when it refused to consider the other preliminary injunction factors” and
affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction.168
IV. NAMI GOES TWO FOR THREE ON THE DCC ISSUES
A. Nami Is Correct Regarding the Discrimination and Undue Burden
Claims
Nami correctly held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Proposition 12 is not facially discriminatory in purpose or
effect and that it does not substantially burden interstate commerce.169 In this
respect, Nami aligns with earlier circuit decisions in Canards I and
Chinatown, which were deferential to the state legislatures’ determinations.170
Importantly, NAMI did not meaningfully argue Proposition 12 is
discriminatory in purpose apart from contending that it follows in the
footsteps of AB 1437.171 That legislation applied Proposition 2’s egg-laying
hen requirements solely to out-of-state producers, which NAMI argued is the
166. N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 520 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145
(1970)).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Glob. Horizons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 510 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)).
169. See id. at 519–20. These holdings might have been different if Nami was reviewing the district
court’s granting of summary judgment de novo, but the “abuse of discretion” standard applied on
appeals from denials of preliminary injunctions only compels reversing the district court’s findings
when it relies on an erroneous legal premise. See Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs.,
753 F.2d 719, 723–24 (9th Cir. 1983). Close call cases, such as the discrimination and undue burden
claims presented here, do not compel reversing, which Nami recognized when it acknowledged “the
inconsistencies in [D]ormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at
519.
170. See Canards I, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013); Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Brown, 539
F. App’x 761 (9th Cir. 2003). These two decisions align with the Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning preliminary injunctions because the Court has stated that a preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . [It] is never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674, 689–90 (2008) (citation omitted). However, even if preliminary injunctions are rarely granted,
this recognition does not provide helpful guidance as to when they should be. See Anthony DiSarro,
Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive Principles of Preliminary
Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 68 (2012) (“The term ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ has not
always been free of ambiguity.” (quoting Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 384
(7th Cir. 1984))).
171. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1; see also infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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same case here: the sales ban was designed to discriminate against out-of-state
competitors.172 However, the district court was not convinced that Proposition
12 had a discriminatory purpose given that Proposition 12, like AB 1437, cited
to public health goals.173 Further, the district court reasoned that NAMI
provided insufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose given that NAMI
failed to point to any evidence from the Proposition 12 initiative campaign
showing a discriminatory purpose.174 The district court was “obligated to
‘assume that the objectives articulated by the legislature are actual purposes
of the statute.’”175 Accordingly, Nami was correct when concluding the
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding NAMI provided
insufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose to warrant a preliminary
injunction.176
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
Proposition 12 lacks a discriminatory effect “because it treats in-state meat
producers the same as out-of-state meat producers.”177 NAMI’s main
argument was that the sales ban is discriminatory in effect because it operates
as a protectionist trade barrier that strips away the competitive advantage of
out-of-state producers, which cannot be justified on animal welfare or
consumer-health grounds.178 In its holding, the district court drew support

172. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2–5, 7, 10; NAMI Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 4
n.1.
173. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1024–25 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 825
F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021). The district court noted that
Proposition 2, Section 25995 of the California Health and Safety Code, was driven by legislative
findings based on public health reports and, given similar reasons cited for Proposition 12, NAMI
failed to provide sufficient evidence to compel a contrary conclusion warranting a preliminary
injunction. See id. at 1024–25.
174. See id. at 1024.
175. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S., 463 n.7 (1981)); see also infra
note 176 and accompanying text.
176. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1024–25. This is not to say that Proposition 12 does
not have a discriminatory purpose, as the district court acknowledged that assuming NAMI’s complaint was true, “NAMI has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that Proposition 12 has a discriminatory purpose” to deny the state defendants’ motion to dismiss. N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No.
219CV08569CASFFMX, 2020 WL 919153, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020).
177. N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518, 519 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). Nami cited to Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence from Wayfair to shed doubt on the proposition that Article III courts validly
have the power to invalidate state laws absent controlling federal legislation. Wayfair, 139 S. Ct. at
2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
178. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–29.
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from Canards I for the notion that Proposition 12 is not discriminatory in
effect by prohibiting how certain items are produced.179 Canards I similarly
held that the “facially neutral” statute in question did not discriminate against
out-of-state foie gras producers because the statute restricted methods
applicable to all producers.180 Additionally, the district court correctly
distinguished NAMI’s reference to Hunt from the present challenge.181 Hunt
invalidated North Carolina’s law, which deliberately stripped away
Washington State’s apple grading system reflecting its superior quality over
USDA grading.182 In contrast, Proposition 12 only stripped away a standard
production method available to any meat processor.183
The district court correctly reasoned that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
National Optometrists supported the conclusion that Proposition 12 was not
discriminatory by placing an equal economic burden on in-state and out-ofstate businesses.184 In National Optometrists, the Ninth Circuit held
California’s ban on a particular eyewear sales method did not strip out-of-state
sellers of a competitive advantage because all compliant sellers were
permitted to operate in California.185 While recognizing the costs of
retrofitting facilities may be expensive, the district court held Proposition 12
was not protectionist because it was “an equal-opportunity burden.”186
Addressing NAMI’s lead time and potential “bob veal” exemption arguments,
the district court further reasoned that these arguments were premature and
too speculative to warrant granting an injunction since “California ha[d] yet
to issue any regulations implementing Proposition 12.”187 Given the uniform
179. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 n.4; see also infra note 180 and accompanying
text. See generally Canards I, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013).
180. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 n.4. See generally Canards I, 729 F.3d at 948.
181. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1027. See generally Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
182. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1026–27; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351–52.
183. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1026–27.
184. See id. at 1027; see also infra note 187 and accompanying text; see generally Nat’l Ass’n of
Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2012).
185. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1027; Nat’l Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1151.
186. N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1027–28 (quotation marks omitted).
187. See id. at 1028–29 (quotation marks omitted). The district court also did not abuse its
discretion regarding this claim because NAMI failed to cite to any case law showing that additional
lead time to in-state providers is held to be discriminatory or that bob veal exemptions, if implemented
in the manner in which NAMI hypothesizes, would likewise be discriminatory in effect. See id. at
1029 n.8. However, the district court did leave open the door that this could be proven when it
considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No.
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precedent supporting the district court’s determination, Nami correctly held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion regarding the discriminatory
effect claim.188 The district court’s adherence to Ninth Circuit precedent was
not in error at this stage.189
Further, the Nami court was not compelled to find an abuse of discretion
when the district court held “Proposition 12 does not substantially burden
interstate commerce” because (1) it concluded that NAMI’s industry is not
inherently national and does not require uniform regulations, and (2) Pike
does not hold laws are substantially burdensome if they preclude specific
production methods.190 The district court reasoned that Canards I, Venison
Producers, and National Optometrists foreclose the argument that Proposition
12 creates a substantial burden impairing the flow of goods.191 This is because
only laws involving “transportation” or “professional sports leagues”
typically impair the free flow of goods enough to cause a substantial burden.192
While Proposition 12 has a significant impact on the national economy, the
analysis under Pike does not focus on whether Proposition 12 imposes
significant costs.193 Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the law restricts the
production of meat products on the basis of geographic origin versus the
specific production method.194 Since Proposition 12 falls in the latter

219CV08569CASFFMX, 2020 WL 919153, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020) (“NAMI has therefore
alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that Proposition 12 has a discriminatory effect. The motions
challenging the discrimination against out of state commerce claims are, accordingly, DENIED.”).
188. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518, 519 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2854 (2021).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 520.
191. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1033. See generally Canards I, 729 F.3d 937 (9th
Cir. 2013); Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2012); Pac.
Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).
192. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1033.
193. See id. at 1033–34; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1970); see also infra
note 194 and accompanying text.
194. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1033–34. While the district court held NAMI
correctly identified the burden of Arizona’s order, it reasoned the order in Pike interfered with
interstate commerce by effectively requiring cantaloupe producers to consolidate their business
operations within the state to engage in interstate commerce. See id. at 1034 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at
145). The district court held the situation in Pike was distinguishable because California does not
require businesses to move in-state. See id. Ultimately, NAMI’s argument by analogy that Pike’s
conclusion that a $200,000 cost was substantially burdensome, which means the multi-million dollar
restructuring costs imposed by Proposition 12 are burdensome, misconstrues Pike’s holding because
restricting interstate commerce through economic costs without something more, such as causing a
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category, and other Supreme Court cases have held similar restrictions can be
permissible,195 NAMI’s argument that Proposition 12 is overly burdensome
on economic grounds did not compel reversal.196
When recognizing Nami’s standard of review on appeal, NAMI failed to
explain how the district court abused its discretion by relying on Canards I,
Venison Producers, or National Optometrists to hold that NAMI’s substantial
burden argument did not warrant a preliminary injunction.197 If the court
accepted NAMI’s argument that out-of-state interests bearing the economic
brunt of Proposition 12 causes it to be unduly burdensome, any law impacting
the national economy would fall into the same trap.198 One state’s population
will always be less than that of the other forty-nine states combined, which
under NAMI’s argument, would result in most legislative decisions being
invalidated under DCC challenges.199 Therefore, NAMI’s failure to
meaningfully distinguish these three cases supports Nami’s holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a preliminary injunction
on substantial burden grounds.200

business to consolidate operations with a particular state, does not demonstrate a substantial burden
on interstate commerce. See id.
195. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473–74 (1981) (holding that
Minnesota’s law requiring milk producers selling within the state to use pulpwood instead of plastic
resin for their milk containers did not violate the Commerce Clause because “[a] nondiscriminatory
regulation serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it causes some business to
shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry”).
196. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2854 (2021). However, it is worth noting that neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit decision
address NAMI’s arguments questioning the legitimacy of California’s alleged in-state interests in preventing animal cruelty or purporting that Proposition 12 has public health benefits in their substantial
burden analysis, likely because the district court held Proposition 12 does not substantially burden the
national economy. See N. Am. Meat. Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1032–34. This leaves the question of
whether preventing animal cruelty outside of one’s borders is a legitimate in-state interest open for
another day, which the Supreme Court should address, particularly when animal welfare legislation
impacts out-of-state entities. See discussion infra Section V.D.
197. See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 39–45 (mentioning the three cases in its substantial
burden analysis but not explaining how the district court erred in relying on them to deny a preliminary
injunction).
198. See id. at 45.
199. See id. Under NAMI’s reasoning, if Delaware, for example, banned the use of all plastic for
all food products sold within its borders, despite this legitimate health and safety interest, these laws
would always be invalidated because other businesses that have any dealings in Delaware could argue
that this substantially burdens their business because they now have to switch over to a nonplastic
business plan. See id.; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
200. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x at 520.
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B. Nami Conflicts with Supreme Court Prohibition of Extraterritorial
Legislation
Although Nami was correct on the first two issues, the district court
abused its discretion in holding that Proposition 12’s sales ban does not
constitute impermissible extraterritorial regulation “because it is not a price
control or price affirmation statute.”201 Ultimately, Nami erred in affirming
the district court’s holding on the extraterritoriality claim for two primary
reasons.202
First, the district court abused its discretion regarding the
extraterritoriality claim because its holding rested on the erroneous legal
premise that Walsh limited the extraterritoriality doctrine to price control or
price affirmation contexts.203 In Walsh, the Court considered whether the
Maine Act—a state program negotiating rebates from drug manufacturers to
primarily reduce prices for uninsured residents—was unconstitutional
extraterritorial and discriminatory legislation.204 The petitioner representing
the out-of-state drug manufacturers cited to both Baldwin and Healy for the
premise that the Maine Act was impermissibly regulating transactions outside
of its borders.205
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the
extraterritoriality principles in Baldwin and Healy were not applicable here
only because “the Maine Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state
transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect.”206
However, Walsh did not expressly or impliedly confine Healy or Baldwin to
price control or price affirmative contexts because that would have required
the Court to overrule its prior holding in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of

201. See id. (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
202. See infra notes 203–31 and accompanying text.
203. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 825 F.
App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021) (“The Supreme Court has since indicated that the extraterritoriality doctrine’s application is essentially limited to cases involving the sorts
of price-setting statutes that [Healy, Baldwin, and Brown-Forman] addressed.” (citing Pharm. Rsch.
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003))).
204. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 649.
205. See id. at 668–69.
206. Id. at 669 (quoting Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81 (5th Cir.
2001)). Walsh did not hold that Baldwin and Healy only apply to price control statutes, but rather that
regulations which do not expressly or inevitably regulate interstate commerce based on the law’s
design or implementation may be valid despite Baldwin and Healy. See id.
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Clarkstown, which it did not do.207 Just as the town in Carbone was not
permitted to steer away solid waste from neighboring disposal sites because it
believed the practice was harmful to the environment, California does not
have the national authority to steer away animal products because it disproves
of the confinement methods used.208 Accordingly, the district court in Nami
undermined the Supreme Court’s mandate that the Commerce Clause’s
ultimate purpose is to prevent “economic [b]alkanization” promulgated by
California’s sales ban.209

207. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). Carbone applied
extraterritoriality principles to invalidate a local ordinance that was not a price setting or price
affirmation statute but required all solid waste within the town to be processed at a designated transfer
station to pay off the facility’s building costs. See id. at 393 (“Nor may Clarkstown justify the flow
control ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem
harmful to the environment. To do so would extend the town’s police power beyond its jurisdictional
bounds. States and localities may not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control
commerce in other [s]tates.” (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935))); see also
id. at 406 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In addition, the practical effect of Local Law 9 must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how
the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of the other states and what
effect would arise if not one, but many or every, jurisdiction adopted similar legislation.” (citing Healy
v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989))). Further, the Supreme Court has also applied
extraterritoriality principles to legislation impermissibly seeking to regulate transactions occurring
across state lines. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626–27, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Illinois Act requiring parties making a takeover offer for a target company to engage
in a substantive disclosure process if 10% of the target company’s shares were owned by in-state
shareholders carried a “sweeping extraterritorial effect”). The Supreme Court is the sole determinant
of whether its precedents are no longer binding law. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)
(holding that it is the “[Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents”).
208. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393; see also supra note 207 and accompanying text.
209. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018) (“The Commerce Clause
‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies
toward economic [b]alkanization that had plagued relations among the [c]olonies and later among the
[s]tates under the Articles of Confederation.” (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26
(1979))); Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citations omitted) (“[O]ur cases concerning the extraterritorial
effects of state economic regulation stand at a minimum for the following propositions: First, the
‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside of the [s]tate’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the [s]tate,’ and,
specifically, a [s]tate may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of establishing ‘a scale of
prices for use in other states.’ Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a [s]tate exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting [s]tate’s authority and is
invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The
critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the [s]tate. Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute
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The district court’s decision in Nami borrowed language from the Ninth
Circuit’s holdings in Canards I and Chinatown, which erroneously construed
a narrow interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine by holding that Walsh
confined Healy and Baldwin to price setting and affirmation contexts.210
However, setting that error aside, neither Chinatown nor Canards I directly
controlled regarding the extraterritoriality claim given the factual differences
in those cases.211 Chinatown concerned a law completely banning shark fins
from the California market based on a legitimate in-state interest of preventing
animal cruelty occurring within its borders, while the Nami sales ban prohibits
specific confinement practices outside of its borders that impact interstate
commerce, without any comparable findings showing how the sales ban was
pursuant to a legitimate state interest.212 Canards I is factually distinguishable
from Nami as well.213 The law in Canards I practically banned one niche
product (foie gras) and included findings discussing California’s interests in
preventing animal cruelty, while Proposition 12 carries a national impact
among veal and pork producers but lacked findings purporting any

may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other [s]tates and what effect would arise if not
one, but many or every, [s]tate adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause
protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another [s]tate.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 580 (1986) (“While a [s]tate may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that
producers or consumers in other [s]tates surrender whatever competitive advantages they may
possess.”); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (“It is a very different
thing to establish a wage scale or a [scale] of prices for use in other states, and to bar the sale of the
products, whether in the original packages or in others, unless the scale has been observed.”).
210. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 825 F.
App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021). But see W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994) (“Our Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as to be controlled by the form by which a [s]tate erects barriers to commerce.”). Ninth Circuit cases since Nami
have recognized that the extraterritoriality principle is not so limited. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 6 F.4th 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e have recognized a ‘broad[er] understanding of
the extraterritoriality principle’ may apply outside this context.” (quoting Ward v. United Airlines,
Inc., 986 F.3d 1234, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2021))).
211. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015); Canards I, 729
F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013); see also discussion infra notes 212–15 and accompanying text.
212. Compare Chinatown, 794 F.3d at 1139 (“California’s ‘Shark Fin Law’ makes it ‘unlawful for
any person to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin’ in the state.” (quoting CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE § 2021(b))), with N. Am. Meat Inst., 525 F. App’x at 520 (“It was not an abuse of
discretion to conclude that Proposition 12 does not create a substantial burden because the law
precludes sales of meat products produced by a specified method, rather than imposing a burden on
producers based on their geographical origin.”).
213. See Canards I, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013); see also infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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comparable benefits.214 The district court erred in relying on these cases,
misconstrued the Supreme Court’s decision in Walsh, and ignored its
applicable decision in Carbone.215
Second, the district court abused its discretion regarding the
extraterritoriality claim because it ignored the fact that the Ninth Circuit
applied the extraterritoriality doctrine post-Walsh in Christie’s, Rocky
Mountain I, and Sharpsmart, none of which involved price control or price
affirmation statutes.216 In Christie’s, the en banc Ninth Circuit invalidated a
portion of California’s Resale Royalty Act.217 The challenged legislation was
not a price setting or affirmation statute, but an act requiring payment of
royalties to an artist if the seller resides in California.218 Christie’s reasoned
that the legislation was impermissible extraterritorial legislation: “[T]he
214. Compare Canards I, 729 F.3d at 945 (“Specifically, the Bill Analyses discuss the background
of foie gras; countries that have banned force feeding to produce foie gras; grocers who have refused
to purchase foie gras; whether there are alternative methods of producing foie gras; and support for,
and against, the foie gras industry.”), with NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5–6 (“Proposition
12 was not accompanied by any legislative findings or evidence that meat from veal calves or breeding
sows (or their offspring) not housed in compliance with Proposition 12 poses any increased risk of
foodborne illness. In the district court, neither defendants nor their intervenors attempted to defend
the law as a food-safety measure or responded to NAMI’s showing that any food-safety interest is
illusory.”).
215. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1029–31, 1032 n.11; see also supra notes 210–14
and accompanying text.
216. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1029–32; see also infra notes 217–24 and
accompanying text. Additionally, other circuits have held that Walsh did not limit extraterritoriality
principles to the price contexts. See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir.
2018) (citations omitted) (“Maryland’s reading of [the Walsh] language, while adopted by two of our
sister circuits, is too narrow. The Supreme Court’s statement does not suggest that ‘[t]he rule that was
applied in Baldwin and Healy’ applies exclusively to ‘price control or price affirmation statutes.’
Instead, the Court’s statement emphasizes that the extraterritoriality principle is violated if the state
law at issue ‘regulate[s] the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its
inevitable effect.’” (quoting Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003))); North
Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The State and its supporting amici argue
that only price-control and price-affirmation laws can violate the extraterritoriality doctrine, an
argument that would seemingly insulate all environmental prohibitions from this Commerce Clause
scrutiny. This categorical approach to the Commerce Clause would be contrary to well-established
Supreme Court jurisprudence.”). But see Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1174
(10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized as we do that the Baldwin line of cases
concerns only ‘price control or price affirmation statutes’ that involve ‘tying the price of . . . in-state
products to out-of-state prices.’” (quoting Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669)). The Supreme Court needs to
resolve this growing confusion as to whether extraterritoriality principles apply outside of Baldwin
and Healy. See discussion infra Section V.D.
217. See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
218. See id. at 1322.
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Commerce Clause precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the [s]tate’s borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the [s]tate.”219 This is strikingly similar to the
effect of Section 25900(b) of the sales ban, which regulates animal
confinement practices outside of California by forcing out-of-state businesses
to change their operating structures if they want to enter the California market,
regardless of their present intentions.220
In Rocky Mountain I, the Ninth Circuit applied extraterritoriality
principles to California’s Fuel Standard legislation and upheld the law
because the legislation did not seek to control extraterritorial conduct but
simply provided credits and caps that encouraged cleaner fuels to impede
global warming, a legitimate in-state interest.221 Similarly, in Sharpsmart, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
against California’s Medical Waste Management Act, which required medical
waste transported outside of the state to be “consigned to a permitted medical
waste treatment facility in the receiving state.”222 The court based the
injunction on extraterritorial grounds because “California has attempted to
regulate waste treatment everywhere in the country” and ultimately concluded
that California “cannot be permitted to dictate what other states must do within
their own borders.”223 This is exactly what occurred in Nami: California is
“dictating” that farmers update their confinement practices to align with its
standards to push its animal regulatory regime on all other states in the
country.224
While the district court seemingly acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit
has applied the extraterritoriality doctrine to non-price regulations post-

219. Id. at 1323 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
220. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990(b) (West 2018); see also infra note 236 and
accompanying text.
221. See Rocky Mountain I, 730 F.3d 1070, 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).
222. See Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith, 889 F.3d 608, 617–18 (9th Cir. 2018).
223. Id. at 615–16. In Sharpsmart, the Ninth Circuit directly relied upon Healy for its applicable
guiding principles, contending that the proposition that “the practical effect of the statute must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how
the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other [s]tates and what
effect would arise if not one, but many or every, [s]tate adopted similar legislation.” Id. at 614–15
(quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 336).
224. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d,
825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021); supra note 223 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Section V.B.
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Walsh, the opinion reflected its hesitancy to apply it here.225 The district court
held that even if the extraterritoriality doctrine applied to Proposition 12, it
would not be a basis for invalidation because it applies to in-state conduct—
sales of meat products within California—which is permissible under
California’s state sovereignty.226 However, the court incorrectly assumed that
Proposition 12 was based on a legitimate in-state interest.227 California did
not argue this point besides contending that it has an interest in preventing all
animal cruelty that could affect California consumers.228 Moreover, the
district court’s interpretation of “regulat[ing] . . . wholly out-of-state conduct”
was legal error.229 Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit interpret this
phrase not as focusing on whether the statute only regulates out-of-state
conduct, but on whether the statute regulates conduct occurring entirely
outside of the state, regardless of its in-state effects.230 This error was an abuse

225. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1031 (“Whether or not Christie’s implicitly revived
the extraterritoriality doctrine’s application to non-price regulations—a proposition the Court hesitates
to accept given the en banc panel’s silence, . . . NAMI arguably has, at the very least, raised an
argument that the doctrine could apply to Proposition 12.”).
226. See id. (citing Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2019)).
227. See id. at 1031–32; see also infra note 228 and accompanying text.
228. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1031–32; State Defendants Brief, supra note 9, at
33. The district court cited to Rocky Mountain II for the proposition that states have a traditional
power to ensure a regulatory scheme applies to out-of-state entities to ensure “consistent . . .
standards,” N. Am. Meat. Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1031, but the district court conveniently left out the
word “environmental.” See id.; Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d at 952. This omission matters because
upholding environmental standards through incentives, rather than forced coercion, is a traditional use
of a state’s police power, see Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d at 952, while practically regulating the way
that businesses confine animals outside of their borders must be examined under more rigorous
scrutiny because California does not meaningfully have a sovereign interest in those animals unless
the state imposes a blanket ban, such as with shark fins in the Chinatown case, see Chinatown
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015). Preventing animal cruelty within one’s
borders is a legitimate state interest, and the Supreme Court has held as much. See Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521–22 (1993). However, the Supreme Court did
not hold that a state has a legitimate interest in preventing cruelty to animals outside of their borders
by imposing economic regulations that spread across the nation. See id.
229. See N. Am. Meat. Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d at. 1031 (quoting Sam Francis Foundation v. Christies,
Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)); see also infra note 230 and accompanying text.
230. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 388, 393–95 (1994) (holding
that a local ordinance impermissibly extended the town’s police power beyond its jurisdictional
bounds, which in effect controlled commerce in other states even though the legislation also impacted
intrastate movements of waste products); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)
(invalidating New York’s law mandating certain minimum prices of milk products sold within its
borders as violating the DCC by impermissibly attempting to control out-of-state commerce); Daniels
Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith, 889 F.3d 608, 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming the granting of a
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of discretion.231
When properly applying Supreme Court precedent from Healy, Carbone,
and Baldwin, it is clear NAMI was likely to have success on the merits in
proving the sales ban constitutes impermissible extraterritorial legislation.232
The Supreme Court prohibits legislation controlling conduct occurring wholly
outside of a state’s borders or that has the practical effect of controlling
conduct beyond the state’s boundaries.233 The first component of Proposition
12, Section 25990(a) of the California Health and Safety Code, requires
California farmers to comply with the new spacing requirements, which does
not regulate extraterritorially.234 The sales ban, Section 25990(b), however,
carries an inevitable effect of forcing other states to comply with the
requirements imposed on California farmers if they wish to continue business
within the state.235
As in Healy, where the Supreme Court held that state laws with the
practical effect of regulating commerce wholly outside of the state’s borders
are invalid under the Commerce Clause, and in Carbone, where the Court held
that the town could not attach restrictions to imports or exports outside of its
borders to control commerce in other states, Section 25990(b) attempts to do
what Healy and Carbone expressly forbid: regulate interstate commerce by
attaching restrictions to animal products brought into California.236 Therefore,
Nami should have reversed the district court’s holding on the
extraterritoriality claim and remanded the case with instructions that the
district court consider the other preliminary injunction factors in light of this
determination.237
preliminary injunction on extraterritoriality grounds where California’s statute attempted to govern
the disposal of medical waste within California and across the nation); Christie’s, 784 F.3d at 1323,
1325–26 (invalidating a portion of California’s Resale Royalty Act as impermissible extraterritorial
legislation even though the same statute also regulated “in-state sales of fine art”).
231. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
232. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332–36 (1989); Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393–95;
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528; see also supra note 230 and accompanying text; infra notes 233–37 and
accompanying text.
233. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; see also supra note 232 and accompanying text.
234. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990(a) (West 2018).
235. See id. § 25990(b).
236. See id.; Healy, 491 U.S. at 332; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393 (“States and localities may not attach
restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other [s]tates.” (citing Baldwin, 294
U.S. 511)).
237. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. N.
Am. Meat Inst. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021). The district court recognized its denial of a
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Though the district court abused its discretion and the error was affirmed
on appeal, the Nami litigation is not over.238 As seen with Chinatown, Rocky
Mountain I and Rocky Mountain II, and Canards, this legal battle will likely
continue at the district court level until it rules on whether to grant California’s
inevitable summary judgment motion, which would then be reviewed de novo
once it is reconsidered by the Ninth Circuit.239 Given this likely reality, NAMI
members will be stuck in a difficult situation as this battle continues over the
next several years.240

preliminary injunction could constitute irreparable injury since the Eleventh Amendment would bar
financial recovery to NAMI members, so it is likely if the district court found for NAMI on the first
factor, it might have on the remaining factors. See id. (citing Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. MaxwellJolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Douglas
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606 (2012)); Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d at 847 (holding
that money damages are irreparable where a plaintiff can “obtain no remedy in damages against the
state because of the Eleventh Amendment”). Further, NAMI persuasively argued that a preliminary
injunction should be granted:
Absent a preliminary injunction, NAMI’s members and countless farmers
throughout the country will suffer severe irreparable harm. . . . [T]he [s]ales
[b]an irreparably harms veal and pork producers by putting them to a Hobson’s
choice: either spend millions of dollars to comply with California’s
confinement requirements . . . or be excluded from the California market and
suffer the resulting loss of revenues and customer goodwill. Either way,
Proposition 12 subjects veal and pork producers to tremendous costs, none of
which can be recovered post-trial because California’s sovereign immunity
precludes a damages action against the State.
See NAMI Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11.
238. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518; see also infra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
However, it is worth noting that while NAMI petitioned for rehearing en banc, their petition was
denied. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, No. 19-56408, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40287, at *2 (9th
Cir. Dec. 23, 2020).
239. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting
that the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the Shark Fin Law in August 2012, which
was denied and affirmed on appeal in 2013, which caused the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint
in December 2013, which was dismissed with prejudice in March 2014 and affirmed by this court in
July 2015). The Rocky Mountain I and II cases were fiercely litigated from 2009 through 2019. See
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 09-CV-02234 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Rocky Mountain II,
913 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2019). The Canards cases began in 2012 and several decisions are currently
pending within the Ninth Circuit. See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris,
No. 12-CV-05735-SVW-RZ, 2012 WL 12842942 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012); Canards District, No.
12-cv-05735-SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 5049182 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-55944
(9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020).
240. See discussion infra Section V.B.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NAMI DECISION
There are five key takeaways from this decision that are explained more
in-depth below.241 First, Nami’s decision upholding Proposition 12 ensures
that commendable animal welfare protections remain in place for farm
animals.242 Second, Nami unfortunately encourages California to continue to
exert significant economic influence over the national economy.243 Third, the
unpublished nature of Nami fails to provide helpful guidance to district courts
that will hear similar challenges in the future.244 Fourth, Nami reveals that the
Supreme Court needs to provide clearer rules regarding its DCC
jurisprudence.245 Fifth, Congress should enact more robust animal welfare
reform that will prevent states from engaging in these problematic economic
practices.246
A. California Provides a Powerful Voice for the Voiceless
There are positive benefits to Proposition 12’s mandate of increased
living spaces for farm animals, particularly in light of scientific knowledge
that animals are sentient beings that experience pain and pleasure.247
Importantly, Nami will undeniably impact the conversation among animal

241. See infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.
242. See discussion infra Section V.A.
243. See discussion infra Section V.B.
244. See discussion infra Section V.C.
245. See discussion infra Section V.D.
246. See discussion infra Section V.E.
247. See Amanda Howell, The Meat of the Matter: Shoring Up Animal Agriculture at the Expense
of Consumers, Animals, and the Environment, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10228, 10237 (2020) (“[A]nimal
treatment laws are backed by concrete evidence that support the notion that the laws are necessary to
protect consumers’ health and safety from the sale of animal products that are produced in a way that
worsens food safety, as well as the lives of animals. Moreover, states also have a legitimate interest
in preventing animal cruelty.”); Marc Bekoff, A Universal Declaration on Animal Sentience: No Pretending, PSYCH. TODAY (June 20, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-emotions/201306/universal-declaration-animal-sentience-no-pretending (“It’s time to stop pretending that
we don’t know if other animals are sentient: We do indeed know what other animals want and need.”);
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as More Than “Mere Things,” but Still Property: A Call for Continuing
Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1067 (2016) (“Doing more to
recognize and highlight animals’ special status as property that is capable of pain or distress may help
us to attain better treatment for animals while preserving an animal welfare paradigm. Our laws regarding animals need changes, including changes in how we frame the matter of animals’ status as
property.”).
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rights scholars and welfare groups about the best avenues for pursuing
changes to improve the well-being of animals.248 While Nami does not decide
whether animal welfare is a sufficient reason to substantially burden interstate
commerce given its procedural posture, this decision will likely pave the way
for greater animal welfare reform.249 Perhaps Nami shows that promoting
ballot initiatives is the best course of action for animal welfare groups.250

248. See Nancy Perry, A Quarter of a Century of Animal Law: Our Roots, Our Growth, and Our
Stretch Toward the Sun, 25 ANIMAL L. 395, 413 (2019) (footnote omitted) (“In fact, California animal
welfare, labor, environmental[,] and consumer advocates came together again in 2018 to pass
Proposition 12, another farm animal confinement measure that added specificity and sales
requirements to the code. . . . Such collaboration and earnest recognition of the need for intersectional
values and support will be essential if we hope to succeed in inspiring major policy reforms for
animals. It provides the best blueprint for our future as a credible and effective movement for social
change.”); Emma Therrien, 2018 State Legislative Review, 25 ANIMAL L. 447, 459 (2019) (footnote
omitted) (“[Proposition 12’s] proponents also consider California’s status as an economic
powerhouse. For example, Josh Balk, Spokesman for [Humane Society of the United States (HSUS)],
predicts that ‘the world’s fifth-largest economy banning the sale of meat and eggs from caged animals
is going to have a tremendous impact.’ Sara Amundson, also with HSUS, praised California for
‘rais[ing] the bar at an important time in [the] consideration of what farm to table means in this
country.’” (quoting Kelsey Piper, California and Florida Both Pass Animal Welfare Laws by a
Landslide,
VOX
(Nov.
7,
2018,
2:38
PM),
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/11/7/18071246/midterms-amendment-13-proposition-12-california-florida-animalwelfare)).
249. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 825 F. App’x
518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021); see also Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Food,
Animals, and the Constitution: California Bans on Pork, Foie Gras, Shark Fins, and Eggs, 7 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 347, 399 (2017) (“[W]hen these cases are seen as state attempts to regulate food sales
and production with animal welfare norms, food’s powerful role in the Constitution and the
Constitution’s influence in food debates begin to emerge. The Commerce Clause and Supremacy
Clause are menu items deciding if states can or cannot protect animals. Routine preemption,
commerce, and federal questions take on animal cruelty and food freedom significance. This pot of
legal ingredients appears to simmer when it becomes obvious that California is just one of many states
seeking these measures.”); supra note 248 and accompanying text.
250. See Pamela Frasch & Joyce Tischler, Animal Law: The Next Generation, 25 ANIMAL L. 303,
323 (2019) (footnote omitted) (“The voting public overwhelmingly supports greater protections for
farmed animals. A handful of states have outlawed the most extreme forms of confinement via the
ballot initiative process, but the recent laws in Massachusetts and California also include sales
bans. These bans apply to animal products produced out of state, making their impact wider (this is
especially the case in California because it is the most populous state in the [United States] and has a
significant agriculture sector). In addition to the promise of slaughter-free meat on the horizon and
positive legislative reforms like Prop 12, some companies are voluntarily changing their corporate
practices to source animal products from farms with purportedly higher welfare standards.”). See
generally N. Am. Meat Inst., 420 F. Supp. 3d 1014.
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B. California Can Continue To Flex Its “Sovereignty Muscles” to the
Detriment of the National Economy
The Nami decision reflects a deeper trend growing within California: the
Golden State can compel businesses nationwide to comply with its initiatives
by passing legislation that does not appear on its face to impermissibly burden
interstate commerce.251 For example, California recently defeated a DCC
challenge of a law that banned the sale of fur products within the City and
County of San Francisco.252 In this case, the district court held that the
legislation was permissible because it does not substantially burden interstate
commerce.253
Further, while the Canards District decision is being appealed, the district
court’s recent declaratory judgment in this never-ending case allows
California to force businesses through a complex pattern of hoops if they wish
to get foie gras into its market.254 While Canards District held California “has
no interest in sales occurring outside of California, even if those sales are to a
California resident or visitor,” permitting California to enact legislation that
forces states to sell non-California products outside of California and then
allows them to transport said products into the state constitutes extraterritorial
legislation.255 The same result could happen in the Nami context: meat
producers have California businesses buy their egg and pork products in
Arizona to then bring them across the border into California, which needlessly
251. See Robert G. Hibbert & Ryan M. Fournier, Food and Beverage Policy Trends To Watch This
Year, LAW 360 (Jan. 1, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1227629/food-andbeverage-policy-trends-to-watch-this-year (“[Proposition 12] is similar to voter initiatives in other
states, such as Massachusetts’s ban on certain farm animal confinement practices. The broader issue
here is the ability for states to effectively dictate animal care standards on a national level. In some
cases, this means that meat-consuming states are dictating animal-raising standards to meat-producing
states.”); see also infra notes 254–57 and accompanying text.
252. See Int’l Fur Trade Fed’n v. City of San Francisco, 472 F. Supp. 3d 696, 702–04 (N.D. Cal.
July 2020); see also infra note 254 and accompanying text.
253. See Int’l Fur Trade Fed’n, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 702–04.
254. See Canards District, No. 2:12-CV-05735-SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 5049182, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July
14, 2020) (“The Court holds that a sale of foie gras does not violate § 25982 when: [t]he [s]eller is
located outside of California[;] [t]he foie gras being purchased is not present within California at the
time of sale[;] [t]he transaction is processed outside of California (via phone, fax, email, website, or
otherwise)[;] [p]ayment is received and processed outside of California[;] and [t]he foie g[r]as is given
to the purchaser or a third-party delivery service outside of California, and ‘[t]he shipping company
[or purchaser] thereafter transports the product to the recipient designated by the purchaser,’ even if
the recipient is in California.”).
255. See id. at *4; supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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complicates commerce and fails to meaningfully prevent animal cruelty
occurring within California.256 Notably, this extraterritorial trend is
growing.257 For example, California recently stated its plans to ban the sale
of new gas engine vehicles by 2035 to fight against carbon emissions, which
will force automobile manufacturers to adjust their plans if they continue to
sell within the California market.258
Ultimately, the problem with the Ninth Circuit’s continued narrowing of
the extraterritoriality doctrine is best illustrated by the following quote:
The narrow interpretation of extraterritoriality endorsed by
California and the Ninth Circuit . . . [is] problematic. If a
state is completely free to indirectly regulate out-of-state
conduct so long as it only directly regulates an in-state
transaction, one state will be able to regulate much of the
country. California could, for example, require any
company that does business in California to certify that all
of its animals, no matter where they are sold, were raised in
California-compliant conditions. Further, California could
require that companies doing business in California, for
example, give their workers union rights, a certain minimum
wage, or free health care throughout their global operations,
even with respect to goods that are not sold in California.
Such actions, however, seem to violate the Constitution’s
implicit command that “[n]o state can legislate except with
reference to its own jurisdiction.” A narrow interpretation
of the extraterritoriality doctrine would therefore render [the
Constitution] unable to fulfill its intended purpose of
ensuring that a state does not exceed its sphere of sovereign
authority.259
256. See supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text.
257. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
258. See Russ Mitchell, Sales of New Gas-Powered Cars Banned in California by 2035: What You
Need To Know, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/202009-23/sales-new-gasoline-cars-banned-by-2035-what-you-need-to-know (“Gov. Gavin Newsom’s
executive order banning sales of new combustion-engine motor vehicles in California starting in 2035
will mark a radical change in transportation infrastructure.”).
259. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s Progressive Global
Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 423, 449 (2015) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592,
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Even if Proposition 12 is later found to unduly burden interstate
commerce, constitute an impermissible burden under the Pike balancing test,
or violate the extraterritoriality doctrine, the Ninth Circuit’s decision denying
this preliminary injunction leaves NAMI with no other form of recourse
because California’s sovereign immunity precludes recovery of costs.260
States and NAMI members are now at an economically problematic
crossroads.261 They must decide whether to comply with California’s
mandates, refuse to do so and lose all business within the state, or litigate at
the risk of falling behind in their compliance efforts if their lawsuits are
unsuccessful.262 Time is ticking: as of August 2021, only 4% of hog
operations within the United States comply with California’s space
requirements that are to be enforced in 2022, making many businesses fearful

594 (1881)). Schmitt further articulated the importance of the extraterritoriality doctrine by stating
that “[t]he extraterritoriality doctrine therefore ‘reflect[s] the Constitution’s special concern both with
the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate
commerce and with the autonomy of the individual [s]tates within their respective spheres.’” Id. at
448 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989)). However, some scholars contend
that the extraterritoriality doctrine should never be applied to DCC challenges where legislation
burdens in-state and out-of-state interests equally. See Cholden-Brown, supra note 91, at 180–82
(footnotes omitted) (“Protectionist bans, even if partial, are ‘local measures for control and suppression
of the problem [that] are in force [and] are generally comparable in their impact to the embargo on
imports.’ California ‘has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood [health]
risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible’ and cannot be expected
to ‘sit idly by and wait . . . until the scientific community agrees on what . . . organisms are or are not
dangerous before it acts to avoid such consequences.’ . . . Extraterritoriality, if applied even when the
challenged statute does not implement protectionist discrimination, is wholly divorced from the
purpose of the [D]ormant Commerce Clause, and[] absent some limiting principle, poses a broad threat
to a state’s authority to regulate conduct with direct effects within its bounds.” (quoting Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1148 (1986) and Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986))).
260. See Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated
on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606
(2012) (“[I]t is clear that it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow [California] to
continue to violate the requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies
available to compensate . . . [p]laintiffs for the irreparable harm that would be caused by the continuing
violation.”); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817–18 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the three exceptions to the general rule that states are protected under the Eleventh Amendment from
suits brought by citizens in federal court are when: (1) the state voluntarily waives its sovereign
immunity, (2) Congress abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity pursuant to a grant of constitutional
authority, and (3) under the Ex Parte Young doctrine when the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief).
261. See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text.
262. See discussion infra Part VI.
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that the Golden State will lose almost all of its pork supply or be unable to
afford the estimated 60% increase in cost for the limited pool of compliant
pork.263 Some scholars believe this sort of “Hobson’s choice” is a valid
exercise of a state’s sovereign authority to legislate for the well-being of its
citizens.264 Since the preliminary injunction was denied, California faces no
economic repercussions for Proposition 12 if it is found unconstitutional.265
As other states follow in California’s footsteps, the issue of the permissibility
of burdens on interstate commerce will not be going away anytime soon.266
C. “Unpublished Opinions” Still Pack a Problematic Punch
It is important to note that Nami does not create binding precedent within
the Ninth Circuit because it is an unpublished opinion.267 However, its
proffered determinations without any substantial reasoning leave district
courts without guidance in balancing future DCC challenges concerning
animal welfare legislation.268 Given the potential ramifications from Nami, it
263. See Scott McFetridge, Bacon May Disappear in California as Pig Rules Take Effect, AP NEWS
(July
31,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-business-health-california-coronaviruspandemic-5ebe70407fcd94ef712c16410f32c4b1 (“If half the pork supply was suddenly lost in
California, bacon prices would jump 60%, meaning a $6 package would rise to about $9.60.”).
264. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 259, at 455 (footnotes omitted) (“To protect the health, welfare,
and morals of its residents, a state sometimes needs to exercise its sovereign power to treat goods
differently based only on the manner in which they were produced. California, for example, must treat
ethanol and eggs sold in-state differently based on the manner in which they were produced to address
California’s role in serious issues that have huge consequences for state residents. Specifically,
California should be able to use its sovereign power to protect the ‘health and welfare’ of its citizens
by reducing the amount of pollution Californians produce. Moreover, California should have the
power to legislate for the ‘morals’ of its citizens by ensuring that they do not participate in animal
cruelty. In doing so, California is exercising its sovereignty for the protection of its own citizens and
thus is not disrupting the allocation of power in our federal system.” (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 661 (1887))).
265. See CAL. PROP. 12, § 2 (2018); see also supra note 260 and accompanying text.
266. See Cholden-Brown, supra note 91.
267. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Becerra, 825 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2854 (2021) (noting that the Nami decision has not been selected for publication).
268. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does
the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 797, 800 (1995) (“[E]ven if a relevant decision can be located, and its precedential
value ascertained, it may provide insufficient information about the facts of the case, the relevant rules,
and the reasoning behind the rules’ application. . . . [O]nly through thoughtful preparation of opinions
can judges demonstrate due consideration of each case. Only through publication . . . in all potentially
law-making decisions can the courts secure the values of stability, certainty, predictability,
consistency, and fidelity to authority, which are essential to the vitality and legitimacy of the judicial
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was prudent that the Ninth Circuit wrote this as an “unpublished” opinion.269
If Nami were a published decision, it would very likely encourage states
within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction to enact additional quasi-protectionist
legislation, knowing it would likely be upheld based on stare decisis.270 Yet
without guidance from the Ninth Circuit, district courts considering
challenges regarding animal welfare legislation may conflict.271 Further,
Nami’s “unpublished” disposition reflects the need for deeper analysis on the
three DCC principles.272 Through a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit could
have defined the contours of the DCC framework to prevent future decisions
from applying them in an arbitrary manner.273
However, unpublished opinions still carry weight: the Ninth Circuit and
other courts of appeals permit the use of unpublished opinions for their
persuasive value.274 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit even permits the use of
portions of vacated opinions as precedential authority.275 Given the
concurrent National Pork litigation,276 California and the Humane Society
have additional ammunition because they can use Nami to support their
arguments that Proposition 12 does not violate the DCC.277 Unfortunately,
NAMI and others will likely lose when challenging similar balkanization
measures promulgated in California in the future.278

system.”).
269. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518; infra note 270 and accompanying text.
270. See Pedroza v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 624 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n unpublished
decision is not precedent for our panel.”).
271. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518; supra note 268 and accompanying text.
273. See Dragich, supra note 268, at 800–01.
274. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee’s 2006 note on the rule (“Under Rule 32.1(a), a
court of appeals may not prohibit a party from citing an unpublished opinion of a federal court for its
persuasive value or for any other reason. In addition, under Rule 32.1(a), a court may not place any
restriction on the citation of such opinions. For example, a court may not instruct parties that the
citation of unpublished opinions is discouraged, nor may a court forbid parties to cite unpublished
opinions when a published opinion addresses the same issue.”).
275. See Michael D. Moberly, This Is Unprecedented: Examining the Impact of Vacated State
Appellate Court Opinions, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 233 n.17 (2012) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit
and others have taken the position that a vacated judgment retains precedential authority on those
issues not addressed in the order vacating it.” (quoting Endsley v. Luna, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1088
n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2010))).
276. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 6 F.4th 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2021).
277. See N. Am. Meat Inst., 825 F. App’x 518; supra notes 271–74 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 267–77 and accompanying text.
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D. The Supreme Court Needs To Clarify What Constitutes Permissible
Burdens on Interstate Commerce and Extraterritorial Legislation
Nami illuminates the need for the Supreme Court to (1) clarify its DCC
jurisprudence to provide clearer guidance to lower courts in their decisionmaking279 and (2) address whether farm animal welfare legislation like
Proposition 12 can constitute a valid, permissible burden on interstate
commerce in light of the DCC principles.280 The standard for permissible
burdens on interstate commerce is a crucial and complicated issue that
remains a recurring question in DCC challenges.281
While Nami reflects the reality that supposedly facially neutral laws that
may be discriminatory in purpose or effect can be upheld to the detriment of
other states, the Supreme Court itself is not immune from inconsistently
applying DCC principles to “facially neutral” laws.282 Therefore, some
279. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Until this
Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the
original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the
guise of regulating commerce.”). Some scholars are critical of Justice Thomas’s decisions concerning
DCC challenges and believe that his decision to abstain from helping the Court to enunciate a
meaningful framework is disconcerting. See James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Why Does Justice Thomas
Hate the Commerce Clause?, 65 LOY. L. REV. 329, 397 (2019) (“It is unfortunate that Justice Thomas
does not see himself as part of the solution in bringing order to the morass he claims is the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas sees his withdrawal of all consideration of the issue as the only
remedy for what he considers to be the doctrine’s betrayal of his beloved textualism. He has used his
considerable skills as a purveyor of the historical records to challenge again and again conventional
wisdom as to the legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause. It is unfortunate that he has sidelined
himself from that continued battle.”).
280. See Hernandez-Lopez, supra note 249, at 352 (“[T]he subject of animals and food is ripe for
constitutional inquiry, since federal law is relatively hands-off regulating welfare for farm animals.”).
281. Compare Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2476 (2019) (“Not
only is the 2-year residency requirement ill[-]suited to promote responsible sales and consumption
practices . . . but there are obvious alternatives that better serve that goal without discriminating against
nonresidents.”), with id. at 2484 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“How much public health and safety benefit
must there be to overcome this Court’s worries about protectionism ‘predominating’? Does reducing
competition in the liquor market, raising prices, and thus reducing demand still count as a public health
benefit, as many [s]tates have long supposed? . . . The Court offers lower courts no more guidance
than to proclaim delphically that ‘each variation must be judged based on its own features.’” (quoting
id. at 2472)).
282. Compare Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 351–54 (1977)
(invalidating a North Carolina law requiring imported apple cartons to bear a “U.S. grade” as opposed
to individual state grades, which while facially neutral, discriminated against other states, particularly
the State of Washington, and thus failed to show the regulation furthered the goal of eliminating
deceptive labeling), with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a
Minnesota statute that banned the sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, which
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scholars contend that new doctrinal frameworks for the DCC should be
created or at least clarified, particularly for the Court’s extraterritoriality
doctrine.283
Moreover, technological advances increasingly blur the
commerce lines between states, so it is important for the Supreme Court to
clarify what constitutes impermissible extraterritorial legislation.284 By doing
so, the Supreme Court can ensure that economic powerhouse states like
California can continue to enact meaningful legislation for its citizens while
respecting the sovereignty of the other forty-nine states.285 The Supreme
Court should also answer whether the extraterritorial doctrine only applies to
price control or price affirmation statutes as the circuit split regarding this
issue continues to grow.286
In general, the Supreme Court needs to clarify what constitute legitimate,
permissible burdens on interstate commerce.287 The Supreme Court’s largely
deferential and fact-sensitive approach, as currently implemented, does little
to guide lower courts.288 The Court should grant certiorari to a case like Nami
although not discriminatory on its face, was purposed to favor Minnesota pulpwood manufacturers
over out-of-state plastic producers). Comparison of these cases reflects how the Supreme Court has
“chartered an uneven course without providing a meaningful explanation of why certain statutes are
evaluated under a lower level of scrutiny.” Felmly, supra note 46, at 479–81. Justice Scalia
recognized this inconsistency problem, once candidly observing that “once one gets beyond facial
discrimination our negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long has been) a
‘quagmire.’” W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
283. See Schmitt, supra note 259, at 425 (“This Article proposes a new doctrinal test that has the
potential to provide clarity and consistency to the courts’ extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Under this
proposal, which is derived from existing precedent, a state regulation of in-state conduct violates the
extraterritoriality principle only when the regulation: (1) lacks a corresponding in-state interest; and
(2) inescapably has the practical effect of regulating conduct beyond the state’s borders.”).
284. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
285. See Felmly, supra note 46, at 509 (“In order to ensure both that states act within their respective
spheres and that novel state initiatives are not undeservedly invalidated, arriving at a paradigm for the
extraterritoriality principle that is clear and that allows for some extraterritorial reach by states is
essential.”).
286. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
287. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
288. See Felmly, supra note 46, at 512 (footnotes omitted) (“Weighing the costs and benefits of
particular legislative initiatives is a job that should be left to those best able to accomplish it. Courts
have neither the available resources nor the expertise needed to tackle such an endeavor. Moreover,
although ad hoc balancing may tend to produce results more tailored to the individual facts of
particular cases, it fails to contribute to the development of a consistent body of legal principles. State
legislators need predictable legal principles in order to respond appropriately to the needs of their
constituents. Prior fact-specific case holdings oftentimes do little to assist state legislators in their
efforts to evaluate proposed solutions to the issues raised by the latest technological advances.”).
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to determine whether states have a legitimate interest in preventing animal
cruelty such that they can effectively regulate confinement practices of farm
animals outside of their borders.289 Not only would Supreme Court precedent
clarifying the DCC framework assist lower courts in these complex decisions,
but it also would guide state legislators as they advocate for the desires and
wants of their local citizens.290 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently
denied NAMI’s petition for a writ of certiorari in June 2021, so hopefully, a
different case can be used to clarify the DCC framework in the future.291
E. Congress Should Be the Solution to Resolving the Tension Between
Animal Welfare and Permissible Burdens on Interstate Commerce
While Supreme Court clarity regarding the DCC framework would be
invaluable for lower courts, Congress holds the power under the Commerce
Clause to provide a lasting solution to these growing questions concerning
animal welfare legislation.292 Cases like Nami expose the need for
comprehensive federal legislation, which would be a step in the right direction
to bring about substantive animal welfare reform while avoiding the economic
balkanization that California has espoused through measures like Proposition
12.293 The Commerce Clause was designed to support national economic
unity, and when billions of dollars potentially hang in the balance, Congress
needs to fulfill its constitutional command to enact legislation that will

289. See supra notes 279–88 and accompanying text. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has
assumed that preventing animal cruelty is a legitimate state interest. See Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521–22 (1993). But it has not clarified how far this interest
expands and whether it extends beyond the state’s borders to confinement practices in other states.
See id.
290. See supra notes 279–89 and accompanying text.
291. See N. Am. Meat Inst. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021) (denying certiorari).
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “to regulate [c]ommerce . . .
among the several [s]tates”). Animal welfare legislation that impacts interstate commerce is a category
that Congress can and should regulate under its broad Commerce Clause powers. See id.
293. See Watnick, supra note 85, at 75, 78 (“New federal legislation should be passed immediately
so that we may begin to behave as a civilized society with regard to the animals that produce our food.
To embrace this mandate, one only need embrace the simple moral assumption that animals have some
moral status; thus, we have a moral and ethical obligation to treat our farm animals humanely. . . .
This morally and ethically sound legislative framework will have the added advantage of avoiding a
patchwork of state legislation regarding laying hens and other farm animals[] and will in the end inure
to the benefit of all those associated with the egg and farming industry, including animals, farmers,
workers, and you.”).
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preempt attempts from state actors seeking to legislate extraterritorially.294
Thankfully, Congress is implementing animal welfare reform, as it
criminalized specific acts of cruelty through the Preventing Animal Cruelty
and Torture Act in 2019.295 However, much work remains to be done in terms
of promoting uniform living conditions for farm animals, and several scholars
have noted the need for greater congressional action.296 Not only would such
federal legislation provide basic comfort to farm animals, but it would prevent
costly litigation and ensure consistency in judicial decision-making when
federal statutes control.297 While this may seem infeasible, two somewhat
294. See Donald L. R. Goodson, Toward a Unitary Commerce Clause: What the Negative
Commerce Clause Reveals About the Commerce Power, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 745, 782 (2013) (“The
purpose of the Commerce Clause, as the Court makes clear in the negative Commerce Clause context,
is interstate commercial harmony and economic union. The greatest threats to interstate commercial
harmony are externalities or spillover effects of state behavior, and the greatest impediments to
economic union are instances in which a uniform rule is needed or desired but is difficult to achieve
because of coordination problems, which may be caused by races to the bottom or conflicting state
regulations of national commerce. Congress, then, should only regulate to address externalities of
activities within states or solve collective action problems that the states are singularly incompetent to
address.”).
295. See Neil Vigdor, House Unanimously Approves Bill To Make Animal Cruelty a Federal
Offense, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/politics/animalcruelty-pact-act-bill.html; Richard Gonzales, Trump Signs Law Making Cruelty to Animals a Federal
Crime, NPR (Nov. 25, 2019, 11:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/25/782842651/trump-signslaw-making-cruelty-to-animals-a-federal-crime. Both articles revealed that the Preventing Animal
Cruelty and Torture Act carried bipartisan support and expanded upon prior legislation by banning
serious harm to specific animals and crush videos. See Vigdor, supra; Gonzales, supra. There is a
question as to whether this law will face the same fate as 18 U.S.C. § 48(b), in which the Supreme
Court struck down a law criminalizing the distribution of animal torture as substantially overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010). In that
case, only Justice Alito dissented, arguing that “the harm caused by the underlying crimes vastly
outweighs any minimal value that the depictions might conceivably be thought to possess. Section 48
reaches only the actual recording of acts of animal torture; the statute does not apply to verbal
descriptions or to simulations.” Id. at 495 (Alito, J., dissenting); 18 U.S.C. § 48(b).
296. See Hernandez-Lopez, supra note 249, at 355; Watnick, supra note 85, at 45; Amy Mosel,
What About Wilbur? Proposing a Federal Statute To Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions
for Farm Animals Raised for Food Production, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 187 (2001) (“Congress
has the power to regulate the agricultural industry under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. Congress should enact a statute that establishes minimum requirements that farmers
must follow in raising farm animals. The statute should acknowledge animals’ individual and
behavioral needs, taking great care to provide them with the basic creature comforts.”).
297. See Hernandez-Lopez, supra note 249, at 397 (footnote omitted) (“Eventual federal
preemption, with statutory law on farm animal treatment, is more likely to provide lasting solutions to
these state and food producer contests, more so than lawsuits examining variants of economic
discrimination. At first glance, California’s preemption jurisprudence appears like a muddle,
measures have been found to be preempted by federal statutes and not preempted by federal statutes.”).
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recent cases show that federal preemption can invalidate California’s
impermissible attempts to regulate interstate animal welfare.298 First, in
National Meat Ass’n v. Harris,299 the Supreme Court unanimously ruled to
preempt California’s legislation that sought to regulate slaughterhouses’
handling and treatment of non-ambulatory pigs because it conflicted with the
Federal Meat Inspection Act’s regulation of such activities.300
Second, in April in Paris,301 a district court granted a preliminary
injunction against Sections 653(o) and 653(p) of the California Penal Code,
which sought to “criminalize the sale and possession for sale of alligator and
crocodile parts in California.”302 The district court reasoned that plaintiffs
made a strong showing that the California legislation was preempted under
Section 6(f) of the Endangered Species Act.303 The court further reasoned that
a preliminary injunction was proper because of the industry-wide, irreparable
economic injuries that would result from enforcing California’s law,

298. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 468 (2012); April in Paris v. Becerra, 494 F.
Supp. 3d 756, 761 (E.D. Cal. 2020); see also infra notes 300–05 and accompanying text.
299. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 565 U.S. 452.
300. See id. at 468. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s preemption
clause nullified California’s sales ban provisions because “if the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s
preemption clause, then any [s]tate could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by framing it
as a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the [s]tate disapproved. That would make a
mockery of the FMIA’s preemption provision.” Id. at 464. As a potential solution to the growing
issue under Nami, Congress could amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to cover the sort of
confinement practices enacted under Proposition 12. See id.
301. See April in Paris, 494 F. Supp. 3d 756.
302. See id. at 761.
303. See id. at 762–63 (citation omitted) (“The ESA governs the treatment of endangered and
threatened wildlife in the United States. Section 6(f) of the ESA, codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f),
addresses conflicts between federal and state laws. . . . The ESA grants authority to the Secretary of
the Interior to designate endangered and threatened species. The Nile crocodile and saltwater
crocodile population of Australia are designated as threatened species, saltwater crocodiles outside of
Australia are endangered, and the American alligator is listed as threatened due to similarity of
appearance.”); see also Janet McConnaughey, Judge Continues Halt of California’s Ban on Gator
Products, AP NEWS (Oct. 15, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/global-trade-wildlife-crocodilescalifornia-courts-29c07e3faff3817c9b68c30a83e30612 (“Louisiana and the other plaintiffs made a
strong showing that federal law, including the Endangered Species Act, controls trade in those
products and preempts California from barring trade in them, [Chief District Judge] Mueller wrote.
She rejected California’s argument that it was only regulating trade within the state. . . . Mueller’s
order shows she understands the importance of sustainable trade and the economic and social impacts
that a ban could have, said David E. Frulla, one of the Washington attorneys representing companies
led by April in Paris, a San Francisco firm that makes and sells products from alligator and other exotic
skins.”).
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especially given the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state.304 Accordingly,
these two cases illustrate that Congress is the key to promote animal welfare
reform while ensuring that impermissible barriers to trade are eliminated so
that states do not infringe on other states’ sovereignty with their
extraterritorial or protectionist legislation.305
VI. CONCLUSION
California rightly acts as a beacon for meaningful change in the realm of
animal welfare that the rest of the nation should emulate.306 However, strongarming states to comply with its policy decisions in order to avoid significant
economic loss is concerning.307 Despite what California claims is the true
purpose of Proposition 12, California provided no legislative findings
showing its benefits to public health, and its legislators knew that the state’s
economic influence is so expansive that most businesses cannot afford to
leave the California market.308
Unfortunately, Nami reflects how California can have its cake and eat it
too.309 By enacting legislation that does not clearly unduly burden interstate
commerce, California can implement policy initiatives that survive judicial
304. See April in Paris, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 770 (citations omitted) (“The injuries alleged here are
largely economic. Economic injury, standing alone, is not generally considered irreparable, as it can
be remedied by the award of damages. However, where the parties cannot recover monetary damages
from their injury, economic harm can be considered irreparable. Where California’s Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity bars a financial recovery, monetary injury may be irreparable. . . .
In addition, the economic harm alleged is not confined to a single plaintiff; the harms alleged are likely
to be diffuse, industry-wide and difficult to quantify as damages. It appears there would be no way to
remedy after the fact the harms plaintiff would suffer[] without an injunction.”). The court further
reasoned that:
[S]etting aside the policy judgments this dispute encompasses, the court
concludes plaintiffs’ likelihood of success as to preemption compels finding in
favor of plaintiffs. The question is not which policy better protects animals, but
whether state or federal law controls. Although California has its own interest
in protecting animals, the reach of that interest ends where the preemptive effect
of federal law begins. Because plaintiffs make a strong showing of preemption,
the court finds the public interest weighs in their favor.
Id. at 771.
305. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 565 U.S. 452; April in Paris, 494 F. Supp. 3d 756; see also supra notes
299–304 and accompanying text.
306. See discussion supra Section V.A.
307. See discussion supra Section V.B.
308. See discussion supra Section V.B.
309. See discussion supra Section V.B.
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scrutiny by stating “legitimate” reasons that force out-of-state businesses to
either comply or face economic losses.310 While challenges make their way
through the courts, looming compliance deadlines force in-state businesses to
make the required changes while out-of-state businesses hold out for
injunctive relief.311 If the lawsuits fail, businesses lose significant capital and
are unable to participate in California’s market until they make the changes,
isolating the state from some out-of-state competitors.312 However, even if
the laws are eventually struck down as unconstitutional, California will not
face any economic repercussions, unless an injunction is granted, because of
its sovereign immunity.313 This troubling reality is the exact type of economic
balkanization that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.314
DCC challenges to animal welfare legislation implicate complicated
questions of federalism, state sovereignty, and legitimacy of state interests.315
Therefore, the Supreme Court needs to provide clearer rules, especially
regarding permissible extraterritorial effects, to aid lower courts when
considering such challenges.316 However, the Supreme Court’s remedies are
temporary, as challenges will continue as new animal welfare legislation
impacts the national economy.317 Therefore, advocating for robust federal
legislation, which could provide uniform and meaningful improvements to the
lives of animals across the nation, is the best solution.318
Tanner Hendershot*
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